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Bitcoin has long been touted as a currency and a payment system that relies 
on cryptography and mathematics rather than trust. But is Bitcoin really trust-
less? And if so, would that be a good thing? This article undertakes a critical de-
construction of Bitcoin and the blockchain, their themes of democracy and trans-
parency, and the idea that they are trustless. The article then proposes a new 
conceptualization of the role of trust in business and contracting: the bridging 
model, which allows for a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between 
enforcement and trust in contract formation. The bridging model is applied first 
to traditional banking, to illustrate and analyze the enforcement mechanisms un-
derpinning the U.S. dollar as currency and the banking system as a whole, and to 
demonstrate that the enforcement mechanisms (government backing and regula-
tion) are not as robust as generally believed. The bridging model is then applied 
to Bitcoin, to show not only that the system requires more trust than is generally 
understood, but also that both currency and payment systems benefit from the in-
volvement of trusted intermediaries in response to problems and crises. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the world realized that trillions of dollars were gone. Individual 
homeowners had taken on outsized home mortgages, and those mortgages were 
bundled and sold—as were derivative products based on those mortgages—to, 
well, everyone. The feeding frenzy of buyers who couldn’t get enough of these 
doomed assets has been well documented in books,1 movies,2 and the popular 
press.3 
1  See generally, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS,
THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD (2013); KEITH GESSEN, DIARY OF A VERY BAD YEAR:
INTERVIEWS WITH AN ANONYMOUS HEDGE FUND MANAGER (2010); NEIL IRWIN, THE
ALCHEMISTS: THREE CENTRAL BANKERS AND A WORLD ON FIRE (2014); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE
BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF
WALL STREET (2010); HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2010); RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES:
HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); ANDREW ROSS
SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: INSIDE THE BATTLE TO SAVE WALL STREET (2009). 
2  See generally, e.g., THE BIG SHORT (Plan B Pictures 2015) (based on the book of the same 
name by Michael Lewis, supra note 1); INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics 2010). 
3  See generally, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Execu-
tives Been Prosecuted?, 61 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, no. 1, Jan. 9, 2014, http://www.nybo 
oks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [https://perm 
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It turned out that the houses were overvalued, the homeowners couldn’t 
pay, and as a result, the mountains of financial products that had been built on 
the backs of those mortgages were worthless.4 Tears need not be shed, perhaps, 
for the hedge funds and speculators who went broke, but the unfairness of ordi-
nary people’s money market accounts and pension funds being thoughtlessly 
invested in these and other complex derivative products is infuriating. 
The indignities continued: Taxpayer dollars were used to bail out banks, 
securities firms, mutual funds, and insurance companies—private, for-profit 
companies which had never before been entitled to government support.5 Leh-
man Brothers was allowed to fail while other firms weren’t, and no one under-
stood how the lines were being drawn.6 As foreclosure rates spiked, some 
bankers used those government bailout funds to pay themselves huge bonuses.7 
Against this backdrop came Bitcoin.8 Introduced quietly in late 2008 to a 
very small group of computer programmers, Bitcoin promised to be a currency 
and an entire payment system that bypassed bankers altogether, allowing peo-
ple the freedom to trade reliable units of currency directly and immediately be-
tween themselves, without having to trust anyone on Wall Street or in Wash-
ington.9 
With a zeal bordering on the religious, Bitcoin advocates trumpeted the 
trustlessness of Bitcoin.10 A financial system without intermediaries meant no 
lying and no one to make mistakes. Instead, a democratic, transparent system 
a.cc/L7LX-F2ZE]; James B. Stewart, Eight Days: The Battle to Save the American Financial
System, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 58; The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash
Course, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2013, at 74; 25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis, TIME,
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,1877351,00.html
[https://perma.cc/YPD2-QJY4] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016). The Huffington Post has an en-
tire page devoted to the Financial Crisis. See Financial Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/VLS9-N6UM] (last visit-
ed Aug. 30, 2016); see also Manoj Singh, The 2007–08 Financial Crisis in Review,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/financial-crisis-review.a
sp [https://perma.cc/4LA8-L9Q2] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
4  See BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 71 (2013). 
5  See generally The Financial Crisis Timeline, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/Financial-Crisis [https://perma.cc/UQK3-MCHT] (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2016). 
6  See Fed Transcripts: Bernanke Chose to Let Lehman Fail, FORTUNE (Feb. 21, 2014, 7:27 
PM), http://fortune.com/2014/02/21/fed-transcripts-bernanke-chose-to-let-lehman-fail [https: 
//perma.cc/N8HR-BKE9]. 
7  Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/business/31pay.html?_r=1 [https://per 
ma.cc/4M6H-N6SH]; Dan Gerstein, The Bailout Bonus Smackdown, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2009, 
12:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/04/stimulus-obama-daschle-opinions-column 
ists_0205_da n_gerstein.html [https://perma.cc/YQB7-NXVU]. 
8  See generally NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
MISFITS AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY (2015). 
9  See generally infra Part I. 
10  PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: HOW BITCOIN AND THE
BLOCKCHAIN ARE CHALLENGING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 70–72 (2015). 
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based on mathematical certainty would create a perfectly reliable financial sys-
tem. 
But is Bitcoin really trustless? And if so, is that a good thing? 
The innovative contributions of this Article are two-fold. First, this Article 
proposes a new model for the conceptualization of trust in business and con-
tract, called the “bridging” model. A new model is needed because existing lit-
erature on trust either ignores or oversimplifies the role that enforcement mech-
anisms play in parties’ decisions to enter into a transaction. The bridging model 
allows for a more nuanced understanding of how enforcement and trust com-
bine to allow parties to overcome their reluctance to transact.  
Second, this Article applies the bridging model to Bitcoin and blockchain 
transactions. The popular Bitcoin narrative suggests that it is an entirely mech-
anized payment system and currency, requiring no trust by its participants. The 
bridging model facilitates a deeper understanding of Bitcoin, however, demon-
strating that more trust is required from market participants than the popular 
narrative suggests. Moreover, this Article posits that some component of trust 
may actually be preferable in currency and payment systems. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I is a critical deconstruction of 
Bitcoin and the blockchain—how they work, their ideological underpinnings, 
and the problems they purport to solve. Part II briefly outlines the innovative 
potential of the blockchain. Part III summarizes existing social science and le-
gal scholarship on trust, explains why they do not adequately incorporate the 
role of enforcement mechanisms, and proposes the bridging model to address 
this deficiency. The bridging model is then applied first to traditional banking 
in Part IV, which demonstrates that the enforcement mechanisms of govern-
ment backing and regulation may not be as robust as they are generally as-
sumed to be. In Part V, the bridging model is then applied to Bitcoin and the 
blockchain, demonstrating not only that their cryptographic enforcement mech-
anisms require more trust than people realize, but also that some component of 
trust is actually preferable in currency and payment systems. 
I. BITCOIN AND BLOCKCHAIN BASICS
Bitcoin is software that is best understood first as a payment system. The 
payment system is run on volunteer computers that are all networked together 
over the Internet.11 This is called being “distributed” or “decentralized”; there is 
no central processor.12 The Bitcoin payment system transacts units of “curren-
cy” also called bitcoins. To provide some clarity, this Article will use capital-B 
11  Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI.
& TECH. L.J. 159, 163 (2012). 
12  Id. at 162, 180. 
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“Bitcoin” to refer to the payment system and the network as a whole, while 
lower-case-b “bitcoin” will refer to the units of currency themselves.13 
Bitcoin is sometimes referred to as a “virtual currency,” because it exists 
only online; it is also sometimes referred to as a “cryptocurrency,” because of 
the complex encryption that keeps the information secure.14 Either of these de-
scriptions is fine. Bitcoin is not the only cryptocurrency, but it is the most 
popular, with the most name recognition.15 Just as the Kleenex corporate name 
is a functional synonym for facial tissues, the Bitcoin name is sometimes used 
loosely as a generic name for all virtual currencies. Likewise, “a Kleenex” is a 
single unit of tissue, just as “a bitcoin” is a single unit of the virtual currency. 
A. Mechanics
The Bitcoin software was written by an anonymous programmer (or group 
of programmers), known only by the pseudonym “Satoshi Nakamoto.”16 
Nakamoto introduced Bitcoin in a white paper published in 2008.17 Nakamoto 
remained engaged in the burgeoning online Bitcoin community for several 
years, but disappeared in 2011, with only the vague explanation that he had 
moved on to other projects.18 His (or her, or their) identity remains unknown, 
but the software lives on. 
Individuals who wish to become part of the Bitcoin ecosystem do so by 
downloading the freely available Bitcoin software onto their computers and 
joining the network.19 By doing so, they volunteer their computer’s processing 
power to run the payment system.20 Again, there is no central processor and no 
13  While not universal, this distinction in capitalization is becoming the convention. E.g., 
Shawn Bayern, Dynamic Common Law and Technological Change: The Classification of 
Bitcoin, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 22, 24 n.5 (2014), http://scholarlycom 
mons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=wlulr-online [https://perma.cc 
/GS9D-W2FR]. 
14  Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public 
Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1500–02 (2016). 
15  See Crypto-Currency Market Capitalizations, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarket 
cap.com [https://perma.cc/C4RU-SVK6] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016). 
16  Grinberg, supra note 11, at 162. 
17  SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM, 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KWX-L8FE] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016). 
18  Joshua Davis, The Crypto-Currency: Bitcoin and Its Mysterious Inventor, NEW YORKER, 
Oct. 10, 2011, at 62. Nakamoto re-emerged only once. Newsweek magazine reported on 
March 6, 2014 that it had (incorrectly) identified a California man named Dorian Satoshi 
Nakamoto as the creator of Bitcoin. Leah McGrath Goodman, The Face Behind Bitcoin, 
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:05 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/03/14/face-behind-
bitcoin-247957.html [https://perma.cc/8TG2-29VL]. This caused a firestorm of attention on 
a demonstrably bewildered and unhappy Mr. Nakamoto, and the real Nakamoto—or some-
one using his account—resurfaced briefly to post a simple message online: “I am not Dorian 
Nakamoto.” VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 75–76. 
19  Grinberg, supra note 11, at 162. 
20  Id. at 163. 
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specific computer (or set of computers) that are designated as the central hub of 
action; the system is powered entirely by a decentralized network of computers.  
The Bitcoin payment system keeps a ledger of all bitcoins and their trans-
action history.21 Each unit of bitcoin currency is unique, and the ledger contains 
entries for the date each bitcoin was created, as well as a history of each wallet 
(akin to a Bitcoin account) where each bitcoin has ever resided.22 At any mo-
ment, the ledger reflects not only the current wallet location of each bitcoin, but 
also the complete history of that bitcoin’s ownership.23 This ledger is called the 
blockchain.24 
A hasty caveat is in order: the blockchain is encrypted, so while it is tech-
nically visible to the public, its contents make no sense to humans.25 
Transactions on this payment system are bundled together periodically and 
processed in batches, called blocks. Each block confirms all the current transac-
tions being processed, while also confirming the validity of the block before 
it.26 Because each block confirms the previous block, each new block also 
thereby validates the entire blockchain.27 A block is processed simultaneously 
yet independently on computers all across the network and is confirmed and 
added to the blockchain only once a majority of the computers agree that the 
processed block is correct.28 So long as a majority of the network is “honest,” 
that is, non-malicious, the blockchain will be accurate.29  
The consensus mechanism also makes the blockchain resistant to revision. 
In order to change a previous block, a consensus would again have to be 
reached. The computers on the network would never go back and redo a previ-
ous block, however—the software instructs them to confirm the previous block 
and then never look back.30 In order to change a previous transaction, someone 
would have to rapidly introduce enough additional computing power to sudden-
ly become a majority of the network. This is functionally impossible—to date, 
the Bitcoin network is hundreds of thousands of times bigger than the world’s 
21  Jerry Brito et al., Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Mar-
kets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 149 (2014). 
22  Grinberg, supra note 11, at 162–63; Brito et al., supra note 21, at 150. 
23  Brito et al., supra note 21, at 149–50. 
24  ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 159 (2014); Brito et al., supra note 21, at 149. 
25  See Last Bitcoin Blocks, BLOCKR, https://btc.blockr.io/ [https://perma.cc/E4EJ-T7RL] (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2016), for a list of recent blocks, and click on each one to see its respective 
contents. 
26  NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 2. 
27  ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 159. 
28  NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 2. 
29  See id.; Grinberg, supra note 11, at 176 n.72. 
30  See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 3. But see infra Part V.B. 
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largest supercomputer. The idea that someone could amass enough additional 
computational power to become 51 percent of the network is preposterous.31 
This inviolability is appealing, but it also prevents error-correction in the 
event of mistake or, more commonly, theft by hacking.32 
A new block is added to the blockchain about every ten minutes.33 As a 
byproduct of this number-crunching, encrypted strings of letters and numbers 
are produced, which are the new bitcoins.34 New bitcoins are created at a prede-
termined rate, with the number of bitcoins produced with each block halving 
every few years, so the rate of production slows over time.35 The software is 
programmed to stop producing new bitcoins when 21 million have been pro-
duced.36 This is expected to happen in about 2140.37 After that, the blockchain 
will continue to confirm transactions and verify previous blocks, but it will no 
longer produce new bitcoins. The supply of bitcoins is thus relatively stable and 
predictable.38  
Once generated, a new bitcoin is awarded, lottery-style, to one of the com-
puters on the network.39 This is known as “mining” bitcoins, and it is one of the 
incentives for joining the network in the first place.40 Some individuals and 
companies make big business of building ever-larger computers to contribute to 
the Bitcoin ecosystem—larger computing power increases the odds of winning 
the new-bitcoin lottery.41 
31  See Jörg Becker et al., Can We Afford Integrity by Proof-of-Work? Scenarios Inspired by 
the Bitcoin Currency, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 135, 148 
(Rainer Böhme ed., 2013); CAMPBELL R. HARVEY, BITCOIN MYTHS AND FACTS 5 (2014); No-
vember 2015, TOP 500, http://top500.org/lists/2015/11 [https://perma.cc/48BH-APU9] (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2016). 
32  See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 3. 
33  ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 27; Grinberg, supra note 11, at 163 n.16; EDWARD V.
MURPHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF
LEGAL ISSUES 6 (2015) (stating transactions can take ten to sixty minutes). 
34  ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 25–26. 
35  Grinberg, supra note 11, at 163–64. 
36  Id. at 163–64, 178–79. Bitcoin production is logarithmic, so the maximum will be ap-
proached but never reached. Id. 
37  ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 2. 
38  See generally NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 3. 
39  ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 26–27. 
40  Transaction fees are also paid to processing computers; once the maximum number of 
bitcoins has been reached, transaction fees will be the only financial incentive for joining the 
network. Grinberg, supra note 11, at 165; Becker et al., supra note 31, at 138; The Trust Ma-
chine: The Promise of the Blockchain, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 2015, at 13 [hereinafter Trust 
Machine]; MURPHY, supra note 33, at 6; NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 4. 
41  See VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 138–46; Grinberg, supra note 11, at 167, 181 n.90 
(discussing “mining collectives”). Bitcoin miners’ computing power is measured in “hash-
es,” that is, how many hashing calculations can be performed in a second. One mining com-
pany, CoinTerra, has enough computers in its Salt Lake City location to make nearly four 
thousand trillion calculations per second. See VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 143–44. 
Some mining operations are based in cold climates like Iceland simply to help keep the min-
ing computers from overheating. Id. at 142. 
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The lottery system, based on processing power rather than a one-computer-
one-ticket system, has been criticized as being undemocratic because those 
with more resources to build faster computers increase their odds of mining 
bitcoins.42 The system has also been criticized for disproportionately awarding 
early adopters who participated in a smaller network when bitcoins were being 
produced at a faster rate.43 
The network is now so large that an individual user is unlikely to mine a 
bitcoin in a meaningful timeframe. The rate of bitcoin production slowed—by 
half—in July 2016.44 Someone wishing to obtain bitcoins but unwilling to play 
the lottery can purchase them, either in person or online, at a digital currency 
exchange.45  
Bitcoins are famous for their price volatility.46 In their brief time on earth, 
bitcoins have been valued at fractions of a penny, $1,388 apiece, and every-
thing in between.47 So, what’s a bitcoin actually worth?48 Put bluntly, a bitcoin 
is worth what someone will pay for it. This is true of everything, even things 
that are electronic and nerdy.49 
B. Recordkeeping and Double-Spending
The blockchain’s recordkeeping goes beyond that kept by banks on behalf 
of their customers. Banks track specific debits and credits (including exact 
payment amounts, dates, and some counterparty identifying information), as 
42  See VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 138–44. 
43  See Grinberg, supra note 11, at 163–67. 
44  Margie Smithurst, Bitcoin’s ‘Halving’ and the Future of the Cryptocurrency, ABC NEWS 
(July 12, 2016, 11:25 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-13/bitcoin's-'halving'-and-
the-future-of-the/7626260 [https://perma.cc/E6LS-M23Q]. 
45  See Grinberg, supra note 11, at 167; see also infra Part I.D. 
46  See Grinberg, supra note 11, at 164. 
47  See What is the Highest Price Paid for a Bitcoin? QUORA,
https://www.quora.com/unanswered/What-is-the-highest-price-paid-for-a-bitcoin [https://per 
ma.cc/5EJ7-HETT] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016) (A sheepish anonymous post admitted pay-
ing 83,333 rupees, or $1,388, for a bitcoin, even though “The exchange price was around 
$1100 at that time, and this was the best buy [the buyer] could get at that time in India.”). 
See generally Bitcoin Price Index Chart, COINDESK, www.coindesk.com/price/ 
[https://perma.cc/7S7B-G97Z] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016) (providing present and historical 
bitcoin prices). The first purchase price of a bitcoin, in 2009, was based on the amount of 
electricity it took to generate one: one dollar bought about 1,000 bitcoins. POPPER, supra 
note 8, at 38. 
48  See CoinDesk.com for current and historical bitcoin prices. COINDESK.COM,
http://www.coindesk.com [https://perma.cc/GMC8-7QRK] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016). 
49  I can’t understand why anyone would pay $140 million for a Jackson Pollock painting, 
but apparently someone wanted to. Carol Vogel, A Pollock Is Sold, Possibly for a Record 
Price, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/20 06/11/02/arts/design/02drip.h 
tml [https://perma.cc/CBV4-R8WY]. 
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well as account balances. Much of this information is reported to a customer in 
the form of monthly statements.50 
Imagine if, in addition to all this, the bank was also keeping track of the se-
rial number on each bill flowing into and out of an account. Of course, tracking 
serial numbers is both impractical and impossible. It’s impractical because dol-
lar bills are fungible, in that one is exactly as useful as any other. There is no 
utility in keeping track of which specific dollars were used to pay a restaurant 
tab versus those used to buy a magazine—that information just isn’t important 
enough to track. Tracking serial numbers is unnecessary, but it’s also impossi-
ble; huge numbers of transactions are made electronically, and so there are no 
identifiable physical dollars involved.51 
With the blockchain, however, every bitcoin is identifiable, and before a 
transaction is logged in the ledger, the payment system network has confirmed 
not merely an account balance, but also which specific bitcoins are being sent.52 
Although this practice would be pointless with dollar bills, it serves two neces-
sary functions with Bitcoin. First, a ledger that identifies the creation of a 
unique unit of currency prevents counterfeiting.53 A fake bitcoin cannot be in-
troduced into the ledger from the outside, because the ledger cannot verify its 
provenance. Second, the blockchain prevents double-spending, a problem that 
dogged previous attempts at creating digital currencies.54 
Double-spending is normal and expected in traditional banking practices. 
When a bank customer deposits one hundred dollars in a checking or savings 
account, the bank will likely then make a loan to another customer with about 
ninety of those dollars.55 Doing this means the bank increases the amount of 
money in circulation and the size of the economy: one hundred dollars has be-
come one hundred and ninety. 
By making this loan, though, the bank has put itself in a somewhat precari-
ous position: if the checking or savings account customer shows up the next 
day and wants to withdraw the hundred dollars, the bank is obligated to return 
them, even though ninety of them are gone. The bank will have to use ninety 
dollars from anther depositor to repay this customer. The bank tracks all of this 
50  See FAQs: Bank Account Statements, BANK AM., https://www.bankofamerica.com/depos 
its/manage/faq-account-statements.go [https://perma.cc/AB4P-6CVW] (last visited Aug. 30, 
2016). 
51  In 2012, for example, about 122.8 billion payments were made electronically in the Unit-
ed States. GEOFFREY R. GERDES ET AL., FED. RESERVE SYS., THE 2013 FEDERAL RESERVE 
PAYMENTS STUDY 13 (2013). That’s not $122.8 billion in total amount transacted—it’s 122.8 
billion different transactions. 
52  VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 123. 
53  Ruoke Yang, When Is Bitcoin a Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 99, 120 (2013). 
54  Id. 
55  See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
40–43 (4th ed. 2009). 
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on its private ledgers—using aggregate balances, that is, not debiting specific 
customer accounts to repay other customers’ withdrawals. 
On a large scale, it is unlikely that all checking and savings account cus-
tomers will want their deposits back at the same time. A few of them will make 
withdrawals, but the bank will usually have enough cash on hand to cover 
them. Banks also regularly borrow money from each other overnight to cover 
any shortfalls.56 
In traditional banking, double-spending maximizes economic resources. 
Lumps of money that would otherwise be just sitting in savings accounts are 
instead circulated in the form of loans, which stimulate economic growth and 
also earn interest for the bank.57 
With digital currencies, however, double-spending is a different kind of 
problem.58 A unit of digital currency is merely a computer file, and computer 
files can typically be duplicated. As players in the book publishing and music 
industries know, duplication of digital goods can be problematic.59 For curren-
cies, however, it would be catastrophic; if any participant in the economy can 
duplicate units of currency, the result would be hyperinflation and the devalua-
tion of the currency.60 Moreover, no one could be sure they were getting an 
original unit of currency, as opposed to a duplicate, which renders every unit of 
the currency untrustworthy. 
With the blockchain, however, the ledger verifies the authenticity of each 
bitcoin as well as its ownership, meaning that a bitcoin can be in only one place 
at one time, and once a person has spent it, they can’t spend that same one 
again.61 
C. Bitcoin’s Themes: Transparency and Democracy
One of the innovations of Bitcoin, both as a payment system and a curren-
cy generator, is that it operates without a central processor. This is deliberate. 
Bitcoin’s original author was critical of currency and payment systems that re-
quired central banks and other trusted financial intermediaries, and Bitcoin was 
framed specifically as “an electronic payment system based on cryptographic 
proof instead of trust.”62 The blockchain, that automated electronic ledger, thus 
operates without any one person or entity hitting a “confirm” button; rather, 
networked computers crunch the numbers and once consensus is reached, the 
56  Id. 
57  See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 136 (“Widely trusted (but not necessarily trustworthy) 
financial institutions handle electronic payments and ensure the integrity of the system’s 
global state. In return, they charge society for this service.”). 
58  See VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 123. 
59  See R. Joseph Cook, Comment, Bitcoins: Technological Innovation or Emerging Threat?, 
30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 535, 563 (2014). 
60  See id. 
61  See ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 18; VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 123. 
62  NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 1. 
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blockchain automatically confirms the present transactions as well as verifies 
all previous transactions.63 
Two themes of Bitcoin philosophy thus emerge: transparency and democ-
racy. Both are nuanced, and they are thrown into relief when comparing the 
Bitcoin payment system to traditional banking.  
Bitcoin transactions are transparent in that they are published. Transactions 
must be processed and published by an open global network of computers. 
Contrast this with traditional banks, which publish almost nothing publicly and 
share information only with the customer and government regulators.64 Most 
individual customers appreciate this, naturally, but it creates a system-wide 
opacity, in that citizens simply have to have faith that the banks are keeping ac-
curate records and managing their leverage, capital reserves, and other financial 
affairs appropriately. The need for faith is somewhat reduced by the fact that 
banks are examined and audited by government regulators, but here too, cus-
tomers need to trust that the regulators are investigating thoroughly and making 
sound judgments.65 
Bitcoin again differs from traditional banks when it comes to identifying 
transacting parties. Although Bitcoin transactions themselves are published, the 
transacting parties are identified only by wallet numbers, and wallets are estab-
lished without any personal identifying information.66 Thus, the transaction’s 
players are unidentified, but the facts of the transaction—its time and amount, 
as well as the wallet numbers of the parties—is public.67 This is called being 
“pseudonymous,” anonymous but for a pseudonym.68 Contrast Bitcoin’s user 
identity shielding with the practice of traditional banks, which are required to 
comply with extensive reporting and know-your-customer regulations.69 
Bitcoin is also touted as being democratic in two senses.70 First, blockchain 
blocks are not confirmed until a majority of the nodes in the network verifies 
63  Id. at 3. 
64  See 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (2012). 
65  See infra Part IV.B. 
66  Grinberg, supra note 11, at 163–64. 
67  NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 6 (likening this process to the “tape” produced by stock 
trades). The FBI maintains that users’ identities can at least sometimes be discerned through 
transaction patterns, IP addresses, and other clues. FBI DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE,
BITCOIN VIRTUAL CURRENCY: UNIQUE FEATURES PRESENT DISTINCT CHALLENGES FOR
DETERRING ILLICIT ACTIVITY (Apr. 24 2012), https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threat 
level/2012/05/Bitcoin-FBI.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WSK-JA9V]. 
68  Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies & Federal Law, 18 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 65, 
66 (2014). 
69 See Catherine Martin Christopher, Whack-A-Mole: Why Prosecuting Digital Currency Ex-
changes Won’t Stop Online Money Laundering, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 6–10 (2014). 
70 Bitcoin is not “democratic” as that term applies to a system of national governance. In fact, 
Bitcoin is often called “anarchist” because it operates without the consent or support of any 
national government. E.g., Alan Feuer, The Bitcoin Ideology, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/sunday-review/the-bitcoin-ideology.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/43SH-7F4S]. 
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and agrees with the calculations in the block.71 Second, the Bitcoin software is 
open-source, and any programmer can review it and suggest changes to the 
code. Once the majority adopts an updated version of the code, that version be-
comes the dominant and governing one.72 This is a popular account of the pro-
cess, but it glosses over an important step. 
A small group of core developers—identifiable humans—has password ac-
cess to the code.73 They review and evaluate the suggestions made by other 
programmers, incorporate what they consider to be the good suggestions, and 
promulgate revised versions of the code for network adoption.74 They approve 
small changes by fiat, but for larger ones they moderate a public debate about 
the utility of the change.75 This bottleneck of human oversight doesn’t fit the 
narrative of a central-bank-less currency, which may be why many advocates 
avoid discussing it. 
Moreover, Bitcoins are only available for purchase from a few sources, for 
those users unwilling to wait to win the mining lottery. This also reduces the 
democratic nature of Bitcoin—a handful of brokers control access to bitcoins.76 
The extreme volatility of the price of bitcoins also prevents low-net-worth or 
risk-averse individuals from participating; the primary Bitcoin forum specifi-
cally advises against converting savings to bitcoins.77 As a result, only wealthy 
people can afford the risk of investing in Bitcoin, which is hardly democratic.78 
71  See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 6; see also supra Part I.A. The consensus mechanism 
solves what is known as the “Byzantine Generals’ problem.” ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, 
at 4. The expression comes from a hypothetical situation in which several Byzantine armies 
have surrounded a city at night and need to coordinate an attack in order to take the city in 
the morning. To reach consensus, envoys of negotiators must be dispatched to the various 
different camps, traveling back and forth between camps all night while having no idea what 
plans the other envoys are brokering. As the story goes, the sun comes up before a plan has 
been agreed to, and the siege is a failure. See, e.g., MELANIE SWAN, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT 
FOR A NEW ECONOMY 2 (2015). Networked computers, on the other hand, can communicate 
with each other near-instantly over the internet, and can certainly reach consensus long be-
fore morning. 
72  Grinberg, supra note 11, at 175–76, 176 n.71. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  See generally Bayern, supra note 13. 
77  Some Things You Need to Know, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/you-need-to-know 
[https://perma.cc/N5KR-V22Z] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016): 
The price of a bitcoin can unpredictably increase or decrease over a short period of time due to 
its young economy, novel nature, and sometimes illiquid markets. Consequently, keeping your 
savings with Bitcoin is not recommended at this point. Bitcoin should be seen like a high risk as-
set, and you should never store money that you cannot afford to lose with Bitcoin. If you receive 
payments with Bitcoin, many service providers can convert them to your local currency. 
78  David Golumbia, Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right-Wing Extremism, in MONEYLAB
READER: AN INTERVENTION IN DIGITAL ECONOMY 117, 124 (2015). 
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D. Third-Party Intermediaries
A whole industry has cropped up around Bitcoin. Some merchants accept 
bitcoins as payment in exchange for goods and services.79 Individuals can in-
vest in bitcoins either by owning them directly or purchasing derivatives like 
futures, options, and swaps.80  
Digital wallet providers and digital currency exchanges act as interfaces 
between Bitcoin and those who want to be part of the system but lack the com-
puter literacy to participate directly. Like using a stockbroker, these intermedi-
aries make purchases and sales on behalf of a customer, generally holding 
bitcoins in their own wallets on the customer’s behalf.81 This means that the in-
dividual user doesn’t show up on the blockchain—the intermediary appears on 
the blockchain as the wallet owner, and the individual has a contractual rela-
tionship with the intermediary regarding the bitcoins.82 
The most famous, or infamous, of these intermediaries was Mt. Gox, a dig-
ital currency exchange website established in 2010 as a place for winners of the 
Bitcoin mining lottery to sell their bitcoins to those who wished to buy them.83 
Mt. Gox was tremendously mismanaged by CEO Mark Karpeles; it suffered 
numerous hacking scandals, the largest of which drove it into bankruptcy in 
2014.84 Mt. Gox held bitcoins on its customers’ behalf, and when Mt. Gox itself 
was hacked, the customers’ bitcoins were taken.85 The individual customers did 
not appear in the blockchain; rather, Mt. Gox’s wallet did. Of course, because 
the blockchain is impersonal and inviolable, a transaction initiated by a hacker 
paying bitcoins to himself appears like any other transaction, and it cannot be 
reversed. 
This critical deconstruction of Bitcoin and its blockchain has already begun 
to unpack several of their important ideological underpinnings, namely their 
democratic and transparent natures. The bridging model, proposed infra, will 
also provide a framework for deeper analysis of another touchstone: Bitcoin’s 
supposed trustlessness. Bitcoin proponents assert that Bitcoin is an improve-
ment on traditional banking; this section has begun the discussion of how 
79  See, e.g., Jonas Chokun, Who Accepts Bitcoins as Payment? List of Companies, Stores, 
Shops, BITCOINVALUES.NET, http://www.bitcoinvalues.net/who-accepts-bitcoins-payment-co 
mpanies-stores-take-bitcoins.html [https://perma.cc/RFA6-QS7V] (last visited Aug. 30, 
2016). 
80  See Written Statement from Houman B. Shadab, Professor of Law, New York Law 
School, to Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/ 
idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/gmac_100914_bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P 
Q6-S25A]. 
81  Bayern, supra note 13, at 25. 
82  See id. at 25–26. 
83  POPPER, supra note 8, at 49–52. 
84  Nathaniel Popper & Rachel Abrams, Apparent Theft at Mt. Gox Shakes Bitcoin World, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/business/apparent-theft-at-
mt-gox-shakes-bitcoin-world.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/48HY-UVCN]. 
85  Id. 
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Bitcoin and banking differ, while Part V will analyze in more depth whether 
Bitcoin is actually better. 
II. THE INNOVATION AND POTENTIAL OF THE BLOCKCHAIN
Bitcoins—the currency—are fun. They’re tech-y, disruptive, and volatile, 
all of which is very entertaining. They also provide a potential investment vehi-
cle: buy low, sell high, like any other product. But they’re not a functional cur-
rency. First of all, not everyone uses them, so they’re not a useful medium of 
exchange.86 Few people even understand them! The infrastructure and educa-
tion necessary to make them accessible to all is prohibitive. The extreme vola-
tility of the price, combined with irreversible transactions in the event of hack-
ing or theft, means bitcoins aren’t a useful store of value, either. The fixed 
supply, plus the inability of bitcoins to be double-spent, mean a lack of flexibil-
ity in response to inevitable crises. All of this is bad for a currency. 
The true innovation of Bitcoin is its blockchain: the decentralized public 
ledger that both verifies and publishes each transaction across the Bitcoin sys-
tem. “The notion of shared public ledgers may not sound revolutionary or sexy. 
Neither did double-entry book-keeping or joint-stock companies. Yet, like 
them, the blockchain is an apparently mundane process that has the potential to 
transform how people and businesses co-operate.”87 
To reiterate a point made above, Bitcoin and blockchain are not synony-
mous.88 Bitcoin has a blockchain, but there are other blockchains that are not 
Bitcoin’s.89 Kleenex makes tissues, but so does Puff’s, Magic Soft, Green For-
est, and others. To name a few examples as of this writing, IBM, Visa, and a 
consortium of private banks are all in some stage of their own blockchain de-
velopment.90 
86  See generally Becker et al., supra note 31; Golumbia, supra note 78; Popper, supra note 
8; Brito et al, supra note 21; Max I. Raskin, Note, Realm of the Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Pro-
cedure, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 969 (2015); Shadab, supra note 80; see also Jacob 
Davidson, No, Big Companies Aren’t Really Accepting Bitcoin, MONEY (Jan. 9, 2015) 
http://time.com/money/3658361/dell-microsoft-expedia-bitcoin/ (noting that many compa-
nies that purport to accept bitcoins are actually just using payment processing services that 
accept bitcoins, and those payment processing services convert bitcoins to U.S. dollars be-
fore remitting payment to the companies). For more on the defining characteristics of a cur-
rency (medium of exchange, store of value, unit of measure), see infra Part IV.A. 
87  Trust Machine, supra note 40. 
88  See supra Part I. 
89  See Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 37 n.6 (2014), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcon 
tent.cgi?article=1003&context=wlulr-online [https://perma.cc/54PZ-3GU2]. 
90  See, e.g., Jemima Kelly, R3 Blockchain Group Adds Five Banks, Brings in Technology 
Heavyweights, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-glob 
al- banks-blockchain-idUSKBN0TZ1MF20151216 [https://perma.cc/4KQV-XJ8L]; Robert 
McMillan, IBM Bets on Bitcoin Ledger, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2016, 12:01 AM), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/ibm-bets-on-bitcoin-ledger-1455598864 [https://perma.cc/ME6N-LQ 
8V]; Daniel Palmer, Visa Seeks Developer for ‘Secure, Scalable’ Blockchain Project, 
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What exactly these blockchains are trying to accomplish is not entirely 
clear. What problem do they solve?91 Some speculation: 
Blockchains offer security, in the sense that ownership is verified before a 
transaction is initiated; the transaction itself is confirmed by the disinterested, 
impersonal network;92 and the transaction is non-reversible. All these features 
have some appeal to someone wanting to convey money or property from one 
party to another.  
Blockchains also offer speed. Assuming it has enough processing power to 
handle the number of transactions, a blockchain is capable of near-immediate 
settlement.93 Once a transaction has been initiated, the network begins to pro-
cess it within a matter of minutes, and the transaction is confirmed and com-
pleted a few minutes later. Contrast this efficiency with the overnight clearing 
generally required by banks, or the potentially days-long process of signing a 
deed and having it recorded. Banks and recording offices are also only open on 
weekdays from nine to five, whereas a blockchain is available 24/7. 
At its most basic, a blockchain is a ledger. Ledgers can keep track of lots of 
things, not just bitcoins. Consider property records again. In most of the U.S., 
real property is identified by metes and bounds descriptions or by a lot number, 
and then transferred via deeds that are recorded and publicly available. If, in-
stead of identifying property by metes and bounds or by a lot number, each 
parcel of real property were represented by a specific bitcoin or similar kind of 
digital token,94 buying and selling real property would become a significantly 
streamlined process. The blockchain could verify the seller’s ownership of the 
parcel, eliminating the need for a title search. Upon receipt of the purchase 
price, the seller could direct the digital token to the buyer’s account, and a few 
minutes later, the buyer would be confirmed as the new owner. 
COINDESK (Mar. 2, 2016, 1:35 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/visa-ad-developer-secure-
scalable-blockchain [https://perm a.cc/N7RV-2WLU]. 
91  I loved a cartoon I saw recently on Twitter, which showed a group of bank employees 
around a conference table. “All our competitor banks have blockchain labs, and I want one, 
too!” yells the boss. The employees chime in: “We’ll need some blocksperts!” “And a hip-
ster office!” “And an actual customer problem requiring a blockchain!” Santiago Molins 
(@stupidcache), TWITTER (Jan. 25, 2016, 5:06 AM), https://twitter.com/stupidcache/stat 
us/691608 174147821569 [https://perma.cc/ZA5S-J9A5]. 
92  A public blockchain certainly has a disinterested, impersonal network. Vitalik Buterin, On 
Public and Private Blockchains, ETHEREUM BLOG (Aug. 7, 2015), https://blog.ethereu 
m.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains [https://perma.cc/M5KZ-22ZP]. Con-
sortium or fully-private blockchains, on the other hand, are maintained by computer nodes
that have been vetted and given permission to join the network. Id.
93  Elliot Maras, Deutsche Bank Explores Outlook for Instant Payments & Blockchain Brings 
Options, CRYPTOCOINNEWS (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/deutsche-
bank-explores-outlook-instant-payments-blockchain-brings-options [https://perma.cc/4VDU-
TM6L]. 
94  YONI ASSIA ET AL, COLORED COINS WHITEPAPER, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1A 
nkP_cVZTCMLIzw4DvsW6M8Q2JC0lIzrTLuoWu2z1BE/edit#heading=h.wxrvzqj8997r 
[https://perma.cc/CRU7-2EL8]. 
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If this sounds bizarre, consider that it’s exactly the same mechanism as a 
traditional recording system: ownership rights over a piece of real property are 
written down in some publicly-accessible place, so they can be traced over time 
and current ownership can be verified. Admittedly, the most hyped attempt to 
put real property records on a blockchain has so far been unsuccessful, but the 
potential still exists.95 
The ownership or authenticity of other property could also be verified by a 
blockchain: artworks, designer handbags, electronic tickets to concerts or sport-
ing events.96 
Contractual obligations may also be recordable on a blockchain.97 Many 
basic contract provisions can be reduced to computer-programming languages, 
because they can be reduced to a series of if-then statements.98 If performance, 
then payment. If nonpayment, then default. If default, then remedies. 
If tangible property is also connected to the internet, then contractual per-
formance (or nonperformance) on the blockchain can have real-world ramifica-
tions. Imagine a leased vehicle with an internet-connected key fob.99 If the les-
see fails to make payment, the fob stops working—and the repo man’s key fob 
starts working.100 Crazy, huh? 
These innovative applications for the blockchain are sometimes referred to 
as “blockchain 2.0.”101 If real-world assets can be tracked and transferred on a 
blockchain, parties can transfer ownership without an intermediary (like a Re-
corder of Deeds) verifying the transaction.102 
The utility of all this may not be immediately clear; why put property rec-
ords on a blockchain when we have a functional recording system in place al-
ready? A more reliable, faster recording system would always be preferable to 
a slow, clunky one, Moreover, blockchain technology, although initially known 
for its criminal implications,103 will likely expand into other useful spaces. Sev-
95  See generally Pete Rizzo, Blockchain Land Title Project ‘Stalls’ in Honduras, COINDESK 
(Dec. 26, 2015, 3:31 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/debate-factom-land-title-honduras [htt 
ps://perma.cc/G33L-HQBE]. 
96  See SWAN, supra note 71, at 9–10. 
97  See id. at 9. 
98  Pioneering work in this area was done by Nick Szabo. See Nick Szabo, The Idea of Smart 
Contracts, NICK SZABO’S PAPERS AND CONCISE TUTORIALS (1997), http://szabo.best.vw 
h.net/smart_contracts_idea.html [https://perma.cc/V6AZ-7V8W] [hereinafter Smart Con-
tracts]; Nick Szabo, A Formal Language for Analyzing Contracts, NICK SZABO’S PAPER AND 
CONCISE TUTORIALS (2002), http://szabo.best.vwh.net/contractlanguage.html [https://perma.c
c/XR6D-BE7G].
99  SZABO, Smart Contracts, supra note 98. 
100  See Smart Property, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Smart_Property [https://per 
ma.cc/8CYY-ZWAB] (last visited Aug. 31, 2016). 
101 E.g., SWAN, supra note 71, at 10. Some sources go further. See id. at xv–xvi (distinguish-
ing between Blockchain 2.0 (financial contracts on the blockchain) and Blockchain 3.0 (fur-
ther applications of smart contracting)). 
102  Fairfield, supra note 89, at 38, 41. 
103 See Christopher, supra note 69, at 19–20. 
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eral sources have likened the blockchain to Napster, the music-sharing ser-
vice.104 What began as a company with shady overtones turned out to be a pio-
neering development in peer-to-peer file sharing, a technology that has grown 
to encompass other useful applications. 
Nakamoto understood at Bitcoin’s inception that the blockchain had addi-
tional potential beyond Bitcoin, but many useful applications for the blockchain 
are likely in the future.105 This overview of the blockchain’s innovative applica-
tions is admittedly cursory, but the blockchain’s potential is only beginning to 
be understood.106 Future work should further investigate the utility and viability 
of blockchain technology in contracts, as well as the legal and social implica-
tions of such applications. 
This future work should also consider the enforcement mechanisms inher-
ent in the blockchain and whether they further the social goals and legal doc-
trines that govern and guide existing contract forms. For instance, if access to a 
rented apartment is governed by the blockchain and the tenant defaults on the 
rent, the blockchain could conceivably inhibit the tenant’s access to the apart-
ment.107 This may, however, circumvent important bodies of landlord/tenant 
law.108 Future work must consider what role a trusted intermediary—including 
but not limited to the judiciary—can and should play in an enforcement-based 
system to prevent unjust or dangerous results. 
III. TRUST
Bitcoin has been touted from its inception as being a “trustless” payment 
system and currency, with the unexamined assumption being that a trust-based 
system is inherently worse than a trustless one.109 This begs the question of 
what role trust does—and should—play in finance, business, contract, and eco-
nomic activity generally. 
Despite the fact that trust has been examined across many social science 
disciplines, no uniform or universal definition has emerged. Trust has been de-
fined as “willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confi-
dence,”110 a generalized “expectancy held by an individual . . . that the word . . . 
104  Cook, supra note 59, at 562; Trust Machine, supra note 40. 
105  See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 1 (referencing escrow services). 
106  Fairfield, supra note 87, at 38, 41; see e.g., SWAN, supra note 71, at xv–xvi. 
107  I am grateful to Tracy Hresko Pearl for this hypothetical. 
108  Szabo also anticipated that there may be circumstances in which automatic enforcement 
may not be desirable: in discussing automatic termination of an auto lease, he pointed out 
that “it would be rude to revoke operation of the car while it’s doing 75 down the freeway.” 
SZABO, Smart Contracts, supra note 98. 
109  NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 1. 
110  Christine Moorman et al., Factors Affecting Trust in Market Research Relationships, 57 
J. MARKETING 81, 82 (1993).
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of another . . . can be relied upon,”111 and, in the context of e-business, “general 
reliance of business actors and private citizens or consumers on other actors or 
systems within the Information Society.”112 
What most definitions of trust have in common is the concept of uncertain-
ty.113 If a thing is certain, there is no need for trust because there is only 
knowledge that the thing will be. Trust, then, is usually described as a belief in 
something despite its uncertainty.114 Definitions of trust often contain not only 
words like “uncertainty,” “perceived risk,” and “vulnerability,” but also their 
antitheses: words like “confidence,” “reliability,” and “integrity.”115 
If defining trust is difficult, measuring it is even more so.116 The published 
literature relies primarily on surveys about individuals’ opinions, or on human 
behavioral experiments with names like “basic trust game” and “gift exchange 
game,” which are variations on the prisoner’s dilemma scenario.117 Huge num-
bers of variables have been analyzed with regard to whether they contribute to 
(or detract from) the strength of a person’s trust. Studies have investigated en-
dogenous factors like the person’s risk tolerance, beliefs about other people’s 
trustworthiness, and aversion to feeling betrayed; exogenous factors such as 
broader social beliefs, ethno-linguistic homogeneity, and common religion; and 
even neurobiological factors that suggest evolutionarily-beneficial explanations 
for trusting behavior.118 
While trust is usually defined in relation to the trustor’s vulnerability, some 
studies also investigate the trustee’s reaction and its consequences. Once a trus-
tor has initiated a trusting behavior, the trustee is in a position to exploit that 
trust for his own benefit.119 However, a trustee who takes advantage of trusting 
111  Julian B. Rotter, A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal Trust, 35 J.
PERSONALITY 651, 651 (1967). 
112  Sara Jones et al., Trust Requirements in E-Business, 43 COMM. ASS’N FOR COMPUTING 
MACHINERY 81, 83 (2000). 
113  Deepak Malhotra, Trust and Reciprocity Decisions: The Differing Perspectives of Trus-
tors and Trusted Parties, 94 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 61, 62–
64 (2004); GERARDO A. GUERRA & DANIEL J. ZIZZO, OXFORD INTERNET INST., ECONOMICS OF
TRUST IN THE INFORMATION ECONOMY: ISSUES OF IDENTITY, PRIVACY AND SECURITY 3 
(2003). 
114  See GUERRA & ZIZZO, supra note 113, at 3. For the purposes of this paper, trust is under-
stood as an emotion that, once in existence, causes or permits a party to engage in some be-
havior. But see, e.g., ERNST FEHR, INST. STUDY LAB., ON THE ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGY OF
TRUST 3 (2008) (conflating the emotion of trust with the trusting behavior it engenders). 
115  Avinandan Mukherjee & Prithwiraj Nath, Role of Electronic Trust in Online Retailing: A 
Re-Examination of the Commitment-Trust Theory, 41 EUR. J. MARKETING 1173, 1177 (2007). 
116  See FEHR, supra note 114, at 2. 
117 E.g., MICHAEL BACHARACH ET AL., OXFORD UNIV., DEP’T OF ECON., IS TRUST SELF-
FULFILLING? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 2–3 (2001); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incen-
tive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? 3 (U. Zurich Inst. Empirical Research in 
Econ., Working Paper No. 34, 2002). 
118  See FEHR, supra note 114, at 2, 15, 21–22. 
119  BACHARACH ET AL., supra note 117, at 3; GUERRA & ZIZZO, supra note 113, at 2. 
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behavior risks punishment from the trustor(s).120 Trustors have even been found 
to punish trustees for seeking verification, or otherwise taking away the trust 
opportunity.121 On the other hand, some people demonstrate “trust responsive-
ness,” in that they are more likely to behave in a trustworthy manner once they 
realize trust has been placed in them.122 Unsurprisingly, the more sympathy or 
respect the trustee has for the trustor, the more trust-responsive the trustee will 
be.123 
Some social scientists posit that trust is required when there is a lack of le-
gal commitment, suggesting that the absence of a legal enforcement mechanism 
causes the very uncertainty that in turn requires trust before the parties enter 
into an agreement or exchange.124 For those in the legal field, however, the 
mere presence of a public or private law enforcement mechanism may not be 
enough. The outcomes of negotiation, litigation, or other dispute resolution 
mechanisms are probably still uncertain enough that trust is required before en-
tering into even legally enforceable agreements. Indeed, at least one study has 
measured the percentage of law students per capita across countries as a proxy 
for lack of trust: large numbers of law students were presumed to signal “prob-
lems in the legal enforcement of property rights and contracts in the absence of 
effective social norms[.]”125 
More broadly, trust plays an important role in economic activity. Trusting 
economic actors invest and trade more, expanding the reach of their economic 
activity in spite of the uncertainty of their returns or utility.126 Given that a trus-
tee is by nature provided the opportunity to exploit a trustor’s vulnerability, it is 
paradoxically necessary for a trustee to decline that self-interested opportunity 
in order for an economy to thrive.127 
When business takes place solely or primarily online, trust formation is 
even more important.128 Without interpersonal interaction and social and cul-
tural norms to aid in evaluating uncertainty, trust formation can be more diffi-
cult.129 Moreover, a trustor engaging in purely electronic business activities 
must place trust not only in the counterparty but also in the reliability and secu-
120  See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experi-
ments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 980 (2000); see also FEHR, supra note 114, at 13 (“Betrayal 
aversion means that people dislike non-reciprocated trust. It is plausible that people who ex-
perience particularly high disutility from non-reciprocated trust have a high willingness to 
punish non-reciprocating players.”). 
121  GUERRA & ZIZZO, supra note 113, at 17. 
122  BACHARACH ET AL., supra note 117, at 6. 
123  Id. 
124  See FEHR, supra note 114, at 3. 
125  See id. at 22. 
126  See id. at 23–24. 
127  See GUERRA & ZIZZO, supra note 113, at 4. 
128  See Mukherjee & Nath, supra note 115, at 1176. 
129  See, e.g., GUERRA & ZIZZO, supra note 113, at 4; Mukherjee & Nath, supra note 115, at 
1179. 
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rity of the counterparty’s information and delivery systems.130 For instance, a 
customer’s trust in an online banking system depends on whether the customer 
perceives the bank to share the customer’s values, on the bank’s responsiveness 
in communicating with the customer, and on the customer’s sense of security 
that the bank will not engage in opportunistic behavior.131 Customers particu-
larly demand assurances regarding the privacy and security of their financial 
information as an antecedent to trusting behavior.132 
The broad availability of electronic information may (at least partially) 
compensate for the uncertainty built into a transaction not conducted face-to-
face.133 Collecting that information may violate privacy, however, resulting in 
“trust tension.”134 The “absence of data impedes trust as accountability is lim-
ited, but data gathering creates trust problems regarding the use of the data in 
question and intrusions on privacy.”135 Another dilemma may be that electronic 
information is not itself well-verified; for example, online review systems are 
under frequent fire for being unfair.136 
A. Trust Models
The process of establishing trust and the effects of doing so are sometimes 
represented in the literature as trust models—either as a kind of flow chart or as 
an algebraic expression. The notoriously math-phobic legal academy will no 
doubt be daunted by an algebraic expression: 
      Henceforth we write t for the probability with which the truster R chooses 
T[rusting behavior] and f the probability with which the trustee E chooses 
F[ulfilling behavior]. We let t* denote E’s estimate of t, f* R’s estimate of f, and 
f** E’s estimate of f*. We call f the trustee’s propensity to fulfill, f* the truster’s 
confidence, and f** the trustee’s confidence-perception. 
Trust responsiveness implies that f increases with f**. But this is not quite 
enough to characterize the intuitive notion: we must add the proviso that the 
function expresses a causal relation from f** to f; E must be made more ready to 
130  See, e.g., Jones et al., supra note 112, at 83. 
131  Mukherjee & Nath, supra note 115, at 1178. 
132  Id. 
133  GUERRA & ZIZZO, supra note 113, at 4. 
134  Id. at 5. 
135  Id. 
136  See generally JENNIFER BROWN & JOHN MORGAN, HAAS SCHOOL OF BUS., U.C.
BERKELEY, REPUTATION IN ONLINE MARKETS: SOME NEGATIVE FEEDBACK (2006), 
http://faculty.haas.ber keley.edu/rjmorgan/reputation%20in%20online%20markets.pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/RK5F-5N 6J]; see also Daniel Roberts, Yelp’s Fake Review Problem, FORTUNE 
(Sept. 26, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/09/26/yelps-fake-review-problem [http 
s://perma.cc/82RL-V8 S9]; Brent Underwood, Behind the Scam: What Does It Take to Be a 
‘Best-Selling Author’? $3 and 5 Minutes, OBSERVER (Feb. 23, 2016, 10:00 AM), 
http://observer.com/2016/02/behind-the-scam-what-does-it-takes-to-be-a-bestselling-author- 
3-and-5-minutes [https://perma.cc/V B32-XF35].
Fall 2016] THE BRIDGING MODEL 159 
play F because she believes that R expects her to. . . . In sum, a trustee is trust 
responsive if an increase in f** tends to bring about an increase in f.137 
Got that? All this is to say that when a parent tells a child, “I’m trusting 
you to . . .” and the child believes them and behaves better, the child is consid-
ered “trust responsive.”138 
The flow-chart models are perhaps more accessible. The flow charts 
demonstrate how variables and behaviors build upon and influence each other, 
moving through “trust” (usually the centerpiece) towards ultimate behaviors. 
For example, Morgan and Hunt (Fig. 1) theorize that in order to develop long-
term relationships between customers and businesses, the parties must have 
shared values and prompt, honest communication.139 These, plus an avoidance 
of opportunistic behavior, build trust.140 Trust, along with the acknowledgement 
of relationship benefits (plus higher relationship termination costs), leads to a 
relationship commitment.141 Relationship commitment, again along with trust, 
leads to parties’ acquiescence, cooperation, and “functional” conflict, while re-
ducing uncertainty and propensity to leave the relationship.142  
FIGURE 1: MORGAN AND HUNT MODEL: RELATIONSHIP COMMITMENT AND TRUST 
137  BACHARACH ET AL., supra note 117, at 6. 
138  Id. For more on trust reciprocity, see Malhotra, supra note 113, at 62–64; see also Madan 
M. Pillutla et al., Attributions of Trust and the Calculus of Reciprocity, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 448 (2003).
139  Robert M. Morgan & Shelby D. Hunt, The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship 
Marketing, 58 J. MARKETING 20, 22 (1994). 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
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Mukherjee and Nath have written multiple papers building on the Morgan 
and Hunt model. In 2003, they analyzed trust-building and relationship market-
ing in the online banking context, proposing a slimmed-down version of the 
Morgan and Hunt model (Fig. 2).143 In this model, they determine that shared 
values, good communication, and avoidance of opportunistic behavior build 
trust, and that trust (along with shared values) leads to relationship commit-
ment:144 
FIGURE 2: MUKHERJEE AND NATH TRUST-BUILDING MODEL 
In 2007, Mukherjee and Nath analyzed relationship marketing in online re-
tailing more broadly. Their 2007 model (Fig. 3) expands the streamlined 2003 
version, introducing privacy and security as variables in trust-building and add-
ing relationship benefits and termination costs into the formation of relationship 
commitment.145 They also expand the end-product of the model, reincorporat-
ing the Morgan and Hunt conceptualization of relationship commitment as a 
waystation toward behavior, rather than an end in and of itself:146 
143  Avinandan Mukherjee & Prithwiraj Nath, A Model of Trust in Online Relationship Bank-
ing, 21 INT’L J. BANK MARKETING 5, 9 (2003). 
144  Id. 
145  Mukherjee & Nath, supra note 115, at 1183. 
146  Id. 
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FIGURE 3: MUKHERJEE AND NATH RELATIONSHIP MARKETING MODEL 
These models offer qualitative analysis of the factors that build trust in an 
individual party and how that trust manifests itself in business decisions. Miss-
ing from these models is the legal component—the enforcement mechanisms 
that exist, in part, to remove the need for trust. 
Some social-science work assumes that the mere existence of a legal 
framework supplants the need for trust, suggesting that trust is necessary only 
where legal mechanisms are absent.147 As any lawyer knows, however, the 
mere existence of a legal system is a far cry from certainty of outcome—
contract enforcement via litigation is full of risks and unknowns, and even if a 
judgment is obtained, it may not be collectible.  
To understand better how enforcement mechanisms interact with trust in 
contract formation, then, a more sensitive model is necessary. 
B. Proposed Model: Bridging
This paper proposes a new conceptualization of trust, with particular impli-
cations for business and law. The model begins with the premise that there is a 
distance between wanting to do something and doing (or committing to doing) 
it; this distance represents the uncertainty of the performance occurring. One 
party is interested in entering into a transaction or contract but is uncertain 
whether the other party will perform adequately. This uncertainty, visualized 
here as a distance, must be overcome before the parties actually enter into the 
transaction or contract (Fig. 4). 
147 E.g., Jones et al., supra note 112, at 83–84; FEHR, supra note 114, at 3.
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FIGURE 4: UNCERTAINTY DISTANCE 
The uncertainty distance may also be characterized as the party’s reluc-
tance to enter into the transaction or contract. Only by overcoming this reluc-
tance will the parties enter into the transaction or contract. 
There is no attempt here to quantify the uncertainty distance. For a particu-
larly risk-averse actor, the uncertainty distance may be wide; for a risk-tolerant 
actor, or for someone who is simply unconcerned with possible negative reper-
cussions, the uncertainty distance may be minimal. 
Whatever its size, the distance between wanting to transact and actually 
transacting is overcome by a combination of two things: trust and enforcement 
mechanisms. The more absent or vaguer the enforcement mechanisms, the 
more trust is necessary to bridge the uncertainty distance and for the parties to 
enter into the transaction (Fig. 5), and vice versa: the more reliable the en-
forcement mechanism, the less trust is necessary (Fig. 6). 
FIGURE 5: WEAK ENFORCEMENT/HIGH TRUST: DISTANCE BRIDGED 
FIGURE 6: STRONG ENFORCEMENT/LOW TRUST: DISTANCE BRIDGED 
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It is also possible that a proposed transaction or contract will not have 
enough enforcement potential or trust to effectively bridge the uncertainty dis-
tance (Fig. 7). In such a situation, the parties would not bridge the uncertainty 
distance, and no transaction or contract would result: 
FIGURE 7: LOW ENFORCEMENT/LOW TRUST: DISTANCE NOT BRIDGED 
Importantly, the word enforcement is not used here in the sense that parties 
will be forced to perform under the contract. Rather, enforcement here refers to 
any mechanism that will make an aggrieved party whole in the event of breach 
or other violation. Enforcement mechanisms eliminate party risk; they may do 
so by requiring specific performance or the payment of damages by the coun-
terparty, or they may be third-party reassurance, such as insurance providers. 
Enforcement mechanisms may be broadly understood.148 They may be 
formal, public affairs such as litigation to compel specific performance or as-
sess money damages. Enforcement may also be informal or semiformal, private 
or semiprivate. Social norms149 and relationship pressures can serve as informal 
enforcement mechanisms,150 though they may be as public or as private as the 
enforcer effectuates—public shaming of a counterparty may be a very effective 
enforcement mechanism, though not necessarily a relationship-building one. 
Alternative dispute resolution, trade association governance, and network gov-
ernance may be considered “semiformal” enforcement, in that third-party adju-
dication may be present (though not by a formal court).151 Trade association 
148  The bridging model may encompass, but does not require, distinctions between types of 
enforcement mechanisms. For more on differentiation between enforcement mechanisms, 
see e.g., Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive 
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004) (proposing a model to distin-
guish between firm-based, court-based, and reputation-based enforcement mechanisms, and 
to predict when each type of mechanism will be utilized). 
149  See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 123–264 (1991) (exploring the development of behavioral norms and social order 
among cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California, irrespective of existing legal and market 
mechanisms). 
150  Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in 
Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1378–80 (2010). 
151  See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Govern-
ance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 562 (2015); see also CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 21–27 (1981). 
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governance and network governance may be considered “semiprivate” as well, 
in that industry players may be informed of adjudications and enforcement, but 
the general public is not. Insurance may also provide a kind of enforcement 
mechanism, assuring parties that they will be made whole (if not by their coun-
terparties) in the event of nonperformance.  
Whatever form enforcement may take, it may be understood as an exoge-
nous force on the party’s ability to bridge the uncertainty distance. The party 
does not exert control over the formation or existence of the enforcement 
mechanism. Trust, on the other hand, is endogenous, in that it comes from 
within the trusting party.152 
Current legal theory in trust and contracts can be incorporated and under-
stood through this bridging model. Professor Fried, for instance, has explored 
whether contractual obligations exist because of external pressures on parties or 
because of internal, moral principles that compel performance of a promise.153 
Professor Fried’s emphasis on the moral basis for contract law does not appear 
in the bridging model, but the tension of whether contracts are performed in re-
sponse to internal or external forces is neatly incorporated: both external en-
forcement mechanisms and internal trust contribute to overcoming the uncer-
tainty distance. 
More recently, Professor Bernstein explores governance of master supply 
agreements between original equipment manufacturers, suggesting that interre-
liant firms in a given industry can, via procurement contracts, turn over the 
governance and enforcement of these agreements to a trade association or other 
form of social governance.154 Likewise, Professor Richman has explored com-
munity institutions among ultra-Orthodox Jews that generate specific economic 
efficiencies in the diamond industry beyond what could be expected using pub-
lic courts and contract law doctrines.155 These industry-specific examples can 
be understood in the bridging model as specialized or additional kinds of en-
forcement mechanisms that reduce the amount of trust necessary to bridge the 
uncertainty distance between wanting to transact and actually transacting. 
In a series of papers, Professors Gilson, Sable, and Scott explore contracts 
for innovation, or contracts between component manufacturers who are work-
152  Malhotra and Murninghan also characterize trust as internal, while contract (an enforce-
ment mechanism) is an external behavioral control. Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan, 
The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 534, 536 (2002). 
153  See FRIED, supra note 151, at 5. 
154  See generally Bernstein, supra note 151. 
155  Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish 
Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006); see also Barak D. 
Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and Globalisation: Peering into the Dia-
mond Industry, in LEGAL CERTAINTY BEYOND THE STATE 31, 35 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 
2009); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992). 
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ing to develop cutting-edge technologies.156 These contracts fascinate because 
the parties do not know at the outset what specifications, or even what prod-
ucts, are going to be produced; rather, the contracts are carefully designed to set 
out each party’s responsibilities in an ongoing collaboration toward something 
inarticulable.157 Gilson, Sable, and Scott propose that these contracts “braid” 
formal and informal enforcement mechanisms together, which in turn builds 
trust between the parties158—this process is in lieu of parties establishing trust 
first, then agreeing to these difficult-to-articulate contractual arrangements.  
The proposed model from this paper would incorporate the “braiding” con-
cept differently, suggesting that braided enforcement mechanisms together in-
crease overall enforcement capacity and reduce the amount of trust necessary to 
bridge the distance between wanting to transact and actually doing so.  
The bridging model assumes a fixed uncertainty distance for any given 
transaction, so that building additional trust—while pleasant—is not necessary 
once the uncertainty distance is bridged. Put another way, superfluous trust is 
nice but not necessary. Increasing amounts of trust over time do not cause the 
enforcement mechanisms to shrink or the uncertainty distance to change. Ra-
ther, enforcement exists as an exogenous force on transaction formation, and it 
is not forced to constrict as trust expands. 
It is also possible that as the relationship between two parties continues, the 
balance between enforcement and trust may shift. Parties may begin their rela-
tionship with one combination of enforcement reliance and trust, but enforce-
ment mechanisms may become more or less reliable over time. For instance, 
Bernstein posits that trade associations and network governance can be effec-
tive;159 the effectiveness of these mechanisms may change as industries devel-
op. A nascent industry may have weak (or untested) enforcement mechanisms, 
but as the industry matures and grows, trade associations and networks may 
self-reinforce. The opposite is also true: a dying industry may have enforce-
ment mechanisms with ever-dwindling authority. In either case, as the efficacy 
of the enforcement mechanism changes, the amount of trust necessary to bridge 
the uncertainty distance would also change. Of note, a dwindling enforcement 
mechanism and a lack of trust between parties may well mean that the uncer-
tainty distance is no longer bridged, and transactions will cease. 
156  See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Inter-
firm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 434–35 (2009) [hereinafter Contracting for 
Innovation]. See generally Gilson et al., supra note 150; Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract 
and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractu-
al Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170 (2013); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract 
Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23 (2014); Ronald J. Gilson et al., 
Contract, Uncertainty and Innovation (Colum. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Paper Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 385, 2011). 
157  Contracting for Innovation, supra note 152, at 449. 
158  Gilson et al., supra note 150, at 1384. 
159  See Bernstein, supra note 151, at 562. 
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The model does not suggest what balance of enforcement and trust is opti-
mal. While it may seem at first blush that an entirely enforcement-based bridge 
is preferable, the analysis in Part V, below, suggests that the incorporation of at 
least some trust is inevitable—even beneficial.160 
Information exchange can expand the quantity of both enforcement reli-
ance and trust. Parties that are better informed about available enforcement 
mechanisms (formal or otherwise) will generally perceive expanded enforce-
ment capabilities, and as parties learn more about each other (values and inter-
ests, history of past dealings, etc.) they will have the opportunity to build more 
trust between them. 
The proposed model may undoubtedly be improved. The model, for in-
stance, does not currently suggest what creates the trust that contributes to 
bridging the uncertainty distance. This vacuum is a departure from the social-
science research summarized above, which does focus on variables and behav-
iors that affect trust formation.161 The role of information sharing, especially 
online, including reputation formation and interpretation, might be explored. 
Future work may also consider additional forms of enforcement mechanisms 
that increase the amount of certainty in a transaction and thereby reduce the 
amount of trust necessary to bridge the distance between wanting to enter a 
transaction and actually doing so. 
IV. THE BRIDGING MODEL APPLIED TO TRADITIONAL BANKING
 As an illustration of the bridging model in application, this Part applies the 
model to traditional banking, understood roughly here to mean the brick-and-
mortar U.S. banking system of the past hundred years or so. 
A. Currency and the Money Supply
Traditional banking relies on money, as opposed to relying on a barter sys-
tem.162 Currency has three characteristics: it is a unit of account, a store of val-
ue, and a medium of exchange.163  
160  Relatedly, Professor Malhotra has suggested that overly complex or incentive-based con-
tacts can be perceived as insulting, and that the proposal or presence of such contracts can 
actually erode preexisting trust between the parties. Deepak Malhotra, When Contracts De-
stroy Trust, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2009, at 25. 
161  In exploring this question, the work of Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992) may be 
useful, which suggests “three broad categories (or typologies) of trust: deterrence-based 
trust, knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust.” Malhotra, supra note 113, at 61. 
162  Some sources distinguish between money and currency—money is an idea, while curren-
cy is the physical representation of value. See Ralph E. McKinney, Jr. et al., The Evolution of 
Financial Instruments and the Legal Protection Against Counterfeiting: A Look at Coin, Pa-
per, and Virtual Currencies, 2015 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 273, 277 (2015). The distinc-
tion is not important for the purposes of this Article, and the terms will be used interchange-
ably here. 
163  Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Considera-
tion of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 848–49 (2015). 
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A unit of account is simply a way of quantifying how many of one thing 
equals how many of another. It’s a way of measuring value against a consistent 
standard. Anything can be a unit of account,164 but in the United States we 
measure value in dollars and cents. Dollars and cents can, in turn, be valued in 
other currencies—at the time of this writing, for instance, one U.S. dollar is 
worth about 0.91 Euros, 6.52 Chinese yuan, 3,309 Colombian pesos, and 0.30 
Kuwaiti dinar.165 
Currency is a store of value when its value is relatively consistent.166 This 
ensures the buying power of a unit of currency today is about the same as it will 
be tomorrow, making the currency a good vehicle for savings. If the value of a 
currency were unpredictable and unstable, people would tend to spend all the 
money they obtain, because they can’t be sure how much it will buy in the fu-
ture. 
Money serves as a medium of exchange because all goods and services in 
the economy can be reduced to their price and can be exchanged for that uni-
versally accepted item, currency.167 This allows people to trade without barter-
ing and facilitates price comparison.168 
A functional currency requires a tremendous amount of trust by an entire 
society. This is true whether the currency is “fiat” (government-issued) or “spe-
cie” (tied to the value of some other precious commodity, such as gold or sil-
ver).169 Specie currencies are presumed to be inherently valuable, while fiat cur-
rencies are valuable because they are backed by a government, making them 
legal tender for paying debts.170 
The U.S. dollar is a functional medium of exchange because people agree 
to express their offered goods and services in dollar-denominated prices and 
agree to accept dollars in exchange for those goods and services.171 It is a store 
of value because its value is relatively consistent, and people trust that their 
savings of U.S. dollars will generally hold value over time.  
The dollar is “backed” by the government, which does not mean that dol-
lars can be taken to the steps of the Federal Reserve and exchanged for any-
thing (such as gold). It does mean, however, that the U.S. government takes re-
sponsibility for managing the supply of money, in terms of both the physical 
164  See Golumbia, supra note 78, at 118; see also Sesame Street (PBS television broadcast 
Dec. 15, 2011) (Drew Brees measures Elmo’s height in inches (24), potatoes (4), tubes of 
toothpaste (3), and footballs (3)). 
165  Exchange Rates: New York Closing Snapshot, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 23, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3021-forex-20160223.html?mod=mdc_pastcalendar 
[https://perma.cc/83ZL-PA6A]. 
166  See Walch, supra note 163, at 848–49. 
167  See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 2. 
168  Money, THISMATTER, http://thismatter.com/money/banking/money.htm [https://perma.c 
c/TYF7-US4L] (last visited Aug. 31, 2016). 
169  See, e.g., Grinberg, supra note 11, at 173. 
170  Id. 
171  See, e.g., McKinney, supra note 162, at 275. 
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bills in circulation and the total money supply.172 As with all things, the value 
of a dollar is connected to its scarcity,173 and the number of dollars in circula-
tion is carefully monitored and managed by the federal government.174 
Using the bridging model, the use of currency in a society can be expressed 
in this way: the uncertainty distance between wanting to transact in U.S. dollars 
and actually doing so is bridged by a combination of (1) enforcement, in the 
form of government backing, and (2) trust. Unpacking this a bit further, how-
ever, reveals that government “backing” may not be the lock-step enforcement 
mechanism many assume.  
Certainly, the federal government has a monopoly on the printing and dis-
tribution of physical dollar bills.175 The Constitution grants Congress alone the 
power to coin money,176 and this process is monopolized by the Department of 
the Treasury.177 Federal law establishes U.S. coins and currency as legal ten-
der.178 To maintain the value of the currency, counterfeiting is a federal 
crime,179 and the Secret Service is tremendously efficient at stamping out coun-
terfeiting.180  
The management of the intangible money supply is handled by the Federal 
Reserve (“the Fed”). The Fed uses three main tools here.181 First, the Fed sets 
the discount rate, the interest rate at which the Fed lends money to other banks, 
which then has a spillover effect on the interest rates those banks charge cus-
tomers and each other.182 Higher interest rates generally encourage saving and 
172  See, e.g., Money, FED. RESERVE BANK DALL. (Sept. 2013), https://www.dallasfed.org/as 
sets/documents/educate/everyday/money.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2ZR-253G]. 
173  See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 2. 
174  See infra Part IV.A. 
175  Most of us take paper dollars for granted, but the transition from coin to paper was a 
dramatic Constitutional question in the latter half of the nineteenth century. See generally 
James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73 (1887). 
176  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. The very next clause authorizes Congress to punish counter-
feiting. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. The states are expressly forbidden to coin money. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
177  31 U.S.C. §§ 301–304 (2012). Section 301 establishes the Department of the Treasury, 
section 302 identifies the Department of the Treasury as the Treasury of the United States. 
Section 303 establishes the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (which produces paper curren-
cy), and section 304 establishes the United States Mint (which produces coins). Id. 
178  31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2012). See also Julliard v. Greenman (The Legal Tender Cases), 110 
U.S. 421 (1884). 
179  18 U.S.C. §§ 472–473 (2012). 
180  JASON KERSTEN, THE ART OF MAKING MONEY: THE STORY OF A MASTER COUNTERFEITER 
56–57 (2009). 
181  The three tools outlined here are the traditional ones. During times of crisis, the Fed may 
engage—and has, historically—in additional economic management tools, e.g. qualitative 
easing. See Tracy Alloway & Luke Kawa, Say Goodbye to the Fed You Once Knew, FORBES 
(Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-14/say-goodbye-to-the-
fed- you-once-knew [https://perma.cc/B8YN-ZU79]. 
182  Kathryn Reed Edge, Bank on It: Interest Rates 101, TENN. B. J., Aug. 2015, at 32, 33; 
About the Federal Open Market Committee, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., http:// 
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discourage borrowing, thereby decreasing lending and the overall money sup-
ply.183 Second, the Fed conducts open-market operations, either buying or sell-
ing securities to expand or contract the amount of money in general circula-
tion.184 When the Fed buys securities, it collects those securities from the public 
sphere and replaces them with dollars, expanding the money supply. When the 
Fed sells securities, the money supply contracts because the Fed is collecting 
dollars from other economic actors and replacing those dollars with less liquid 
securities. Third, the Fed, as a banking regulator, can adjust the reserve re-
quirement, or the amount of deposits the banks are required to keep.185 A re-
serve requirement of 10 percent means that $90 of every $100 can be lent out; a 
reserve requirement of 12 percent means that only $88 of every $100 can be 
lent. Increasing the reserve requirement thus decreases the money supply. 
Managing the money supply steadies a currency’s value; the invention of 
central banking demonstrably reduced the volatility of currencies and the depth 
of economic shocks.186 Most economists agree that central bank management of 
the money supply is a social good.187 
This management of the money supply is a form of enforcement, in that it 
is an exogenous force reassuring users that the vehicle is safe and reliable. To 
be sure, money supply management it is not automatic. Whereas Bitcoin’s al-
gorithm automatically adjusts its difficulty to ensure that production of bitcoins 
happens consistently every ten minutes,188 the supply of U.S. dollars is tracked 
by the Fed and small adjustments are made as the Boards of Governors or the 
Federal Open Market Committee see fit.189 This method is, of course, not per-
fectly reliable. The Fed is made up of people, who sometimes make mistakes. 
They’re trying their best, but they’re imperfect. This decreases the impact of 
the enforcement portion of the bridge, requiring more trust. 
Nearly everyone in America uses dollars, even those who refuse to use 
banks.190 This suggests that whatever deficiencies may exist in the enforcement 
mechanisms behind the currency, there is enough trust among Americans to 
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm [https://perma.cc/3ULA-PGHC] (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
183  See PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 54–
55 (2016). 
184  12 U.S.C. § 353 (2012); see also Mark F. Bernstein, Note, The Federal Open Market 
Committee and the Sharing of Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 
111, 114–18 (1989). 
185  12 U.S.C. § 461 (2012). 
186  BERNARD SHULL, THE FOURTH BRANCH: THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S UNLIKELY RISE TO
POWER AND INFLUENCE 36–40, 60–61 (2005). 
187  Grinberg, supra note 11, at 173 n.64; Golumbia, supra note 78, at 124. 
188  ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 25–26. 
189 E.g., Jeff Cox, Fed Raises Rates by 25 Basis Points, First Since 2006, CNBC (Dec. 16,
2015, 2:41 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/16/fed-raises-rates-for-first-time-since-200 
6.html [https://perma.cc/F9K6-P8PU].
190  Grinberg, supra note 11, at 172–73; POPPER, supra note 8, at 16 (“The essential quality 
of successful money . . . [is] the number of people willing to use it.”). 
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overcome the uncertainty distance and use dollars for daily transactions. Un-
less, of course, people use dollars out of inertia or ignorance—the dollar has 
been strong and reliable for most Americans’ lifetimes, and some people may 
have never paused to wonder why they use dollars or whether there are other 
options (Americans have short memories191). On the other hand, in countries 
where the fiat currency is unreliable and untrustworthy, people do move away 
from using it.192 
B. Deposits and Lending
A traditional bank, at its most basic function, takes deposits and makes 
loans. Why is it we’re willing to deposit money with a bank? We certainly 
wouldn’t do such a thing with strangers—hand them a wad of cash and say, 
“Hang on to this for me, but give it back when I ask.” Why would a person 
want to hand over their savings to a bank, on the bank’s mere promise that he 
or she could withdraw the money again later? 
Banks are physically safer than keeping funds at home, provide deposit 
customers with cheap and reliable payment systems, and ideally pay interest on 
deposited funds.193 Much of a bank’s business, however, is shrouded in secrecy. 
Banks keep customer information private, so much information is kept where it 
cannot be verified by anyone other than regulators. Banks keep their private 
ledgers regarding customer information, and central banks keep ledgers of in-
dividual banks’ accounts.194 This is good for individual privacy, but bad in the 
sense that opacity can enable bad business practices and fail to find or prevent 
mistakes. 
What allows a depositor to overcome the uncertainty that deposited funds 
can be withdrawn again? A combination of exogenous enforcement mecha-
nisms and endogenous trust. Enforcement comes, most obviously, from the in-
surance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) that 
covers most funds on deposit with banks. A second type of enforcement comes 
from governmental regulation of banks. 
191  The English comedian Eddie Izzard has told audiences, 
I grew up in Europe, where the history comes from. . . . You tear your history down, man. ‘It’s 
thirty years old, let’s smash it and put a car park here.’ I have seen it in stories. I saw . . . some-
thing in Miami. ‘We’ve redecorated this building to how it looked over fifty years ago.’ People 
are going, ‘No, surely not! No! No one was alive then.’ 
EDDIE IZZARD: DRESS TO KILL (Ella Communications Ltd. 1999). 
192  See VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 17–21, 208–10 (discussing Argentina’s currency 
crises and public affinity for alternative financial service providers and Bitcoin). 
193  Catherine Martin Christopher, Mobile Banking: The Answer for the Unbanked in Ameri-
ca?, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 221, 226–30 (2015). 
194  See 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 204.5 (2012). 
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The FDIC insures funds on deposit; that is, if the bank fails and is unable to 
repay its depositors, the FDIC will do so, within the statutory caps.195 This sys-
tem has been in place since 1933 and remains “the cornerstone on which Amer-
ican consumer confidence in its banking and financial system rests . . . .”196 Us-
ing the bridging model, this is an obvious enforcement mechanism—external 
assurances that allow individuals to overcome their reluctance to place their 
money with banks.197 
In addition to deposit insurance, bank customers are protected by govern-
ment regulation of banks.198 Every bank in the United States is “examined” on a 
regular basis, during which exhaustive process the safety and soundness of the 
bank is tested.199 Errors are corrected, changes are recommended, and (some-
times) punishments are imposed.200 The majority of commentators agree that 
bank regulation is necessary,201 but it is far from perfect. Banks are subject to 
examination by a convoluted web of government regulators,202 which results in 
inefficiencies and inconsistencies across the industry.203 Moreover, the whims 
of one individual examiner may have a disproportionate effect on an individual 
firm.204 
So, while deposit insurance and bank regulation provide external reassur-
ances to bank customers that the bank is safe to do business with,205 these en-
forcement mechanisms are not perfect. FDIC insurance is not unlimited, and 
bank examination—like insurance rate management—is performed by fallible 
195  12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 303.20–.25 (2014); see also Deposit Insurance, 
FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit [https://perma.cc/N9VX-XZZE] (last visited Aug. 31, 
2016). 
196  Nancy J. Coppola, Note, Increased Federal Deposit Insurance Coverage: At What Cost?, 
6 N.C. BANKING INST. 429, 430 (2002). 
197  Not everyone overcomes this reluctance, of course. See Christopher, supra note 193, at 
224–26 (discussing why some Americans are unbanked). 
198  Notes, Compulsory Incorporation of Banks and the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 HARV. L.
REV. 629, 629 (1910). 
199  See Melanie L. Fein, Functional Regulation: A Concept for Glass-Steagall Reform?, 2 
STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 89, 106–14 (1995). 
200  See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 55, at 627–44.  
201  See, e.g., E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FED. RESERVE BANK MINNEAPOLIS, ARE BANKS
SPECIAL? (1982). 
202  See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 55, at 632. Banks may be chartered (incorporated) under 
either state or federal law; the selection of one over the other changes the constellation of 
regulators keeping watch over the bank, though not necessarily the principles of the regula-
tions. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual 
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 677–78 (1988). 
203  See Fein, supra note 199, at 109–13. The bank regulation landscape has evolved since 
Ms. Fein’s article was published, of course, but the regulatory burdens and problems she 
highlights have not been resolved. 
204  CARNELL ET AL., supra note 55, at 642 (“By raising eyebrows at a dubious practice, a 
bank examiner—even if officially only preparing an examination report—engages in a sort 
of enforcement.”). 
205  Brito et al., supra note 21, at 194. 
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humans. While would-be banking customers may bridge their uncertainty dis-
tances partially with the knowledge and understanding of available enforce-
ment mechanisms, the remainder of that distance must be bridged by the cus-
tomer’s trust in the bank. 
These are but a few examples of the balance of enforcement and trust that 
exist within the traditional banking industry. More work can certainly be done 
in applying the bridging model to more complex banking and shadow-banking 
activities.  
Those who would like to enter the banking system but have not yet done so 
must bridge their uncertainty distance with a combination of enforcement and 
trust: enforcement exists in the imperfect forms of money supply management 
and bank regulation, both primarily via the Fed. These enforcement mecha-
nisms are not perfectly robust, however, and the remainder of the uncertainty 
distance must be bridged with user trust. 
Bitcoin proponents, by contrast, argue that Bitcoin is a trustless system, 
and that such a system is superior to the traditional-yet-flawed U.S. banking 
system. The next Part addresses these issues. 
V. THE BRIDGING MODEL APPLIED TO BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN
Advocates trumpet the “trustlessness” of Bitcoin and the blockchain as one 
of the system’s core virtues.206 But Bitcoin and the blockchain are not really 
trustless. And that’s a good thing. The bridging model is useful in understand-
ing the issues at play. 
A. Bitcoin as Currency
As a currency, Bitcoin is said to be trustless because the money supply is 
predetermined. Bitcoins are produced at a predictable rate, with a maximum 
number pre-established.207 Bitcoins cannot be double-spent, meaning each ex-
isting coin is only in one place at one time.208 Contrast this with the money 
supply in traditional banking, in which the Bureau of Printing and Engraving 
can increase the physical supply of currency, and the Fed can manipulate the 
intangible money supply by altering interest rates, engaging in open-market op-
erations, and changing the reserve requirement.209 With Bitcoin, on the other 
hand, there are no central bankers making such decisions. 
Applying the bridging model to this narrative, it would appear that those 
who use Bitcoin as a currency rely entirely on its exogenous enforcement 
206  See, e.g., NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 1. 
207  See generally id.; POPPER, supra note 8, at 30 (stating the ideological underpinnings of 
Bitcoin were as a currency). 
208  See supra Part I.B. Contra John Carney, Of Course You Can Have Fractional Reserve 
Bitcoin Banks, CNBC (Sept. 20, 2013, 9:53 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2013/09/20/of-
course-you-can-have-fractional-reserve-bitcoin-banks.html [https://perma.cc/8H5X-KN2N]. 
209  See supra Part I.B. 
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mechanism—predetermined currency production—to bridge the uncertainty 
distance. This is not enforcement in the sense that government backing or man-
agement supports the currency, obviously, but in the sense that the Bitcoin pro-
tocol is entirely self-enforcing. Computer programming is the most mechanical 
of mechanisms: If X, then Y, no questions asked.210 If Bitcoin is entirely en-
forcement, then, no trust is necessary (once the user is well-enough informed to 
understand the mechanics of the enforcement). 
All currency, however, requires trust—trust that others are willing to ac-
cept that currency in exchange for goods and services.211 Moreover, all curren-
cies require trust in the origin source; with Bitcoin, that trust is placed in the 
code and the encryption process.212 These are publicly available in a way that 
traditional banking methods aren’t,213 but transparency isn’t everything. The 
majority of the population doesn’t have the computer literacy to understand the 
code and verify that it’s good. Those people are simply trusting that the pro-
grammers (from Nakamoto onward) have done the right thing. 
The fixed and regular supply of bitcoins, together with their inability to be 
double-spent, hearkens to the appeal of gold as a currency214—scarcity creates 
value.215 However, here’s the bombshell that doesn’t get much attention: since 
Bitcoin is a computer program, the maximum number of bitcoins, and the rate 
at which they are mined, can be changed.216 
Increasing (or decreasing) the maximum number of bitcoins in circulation 
is not a common or even popular suggestion, but it is possible. The core devel-
opers have the ability to make this change, though they would admittedly have 
to convince 51 percent of the Bitcoin network to adopt the updated version of 
the software that contains the modification. 
Making significant changes to the Bitcoin software is not without prece-
dent, but it is also not without controversy. For instance, since Bitcoin’s incep-
tion, each transaction block in the blockchain has been limited to one megabyte 
in size.217 By early 2016, however, so many transactions were taking place at 
any one time that a single block wasn’t big enough to process them all, threat-
ening delays in the peer-to-peer settlement.218 The debate over whether to re-
210  See SZABO, Smart Contracts, supra note 98. 
211  See POPPER, supra note 8, at 55. 
212  Id. 
213  Id. 
214  Sarah Gruber, Note, Trust, Identity, and Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the Next Vir-
tual Havens for Money Laundering and Tax Evasion?, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 135, 150 
(2013). 
215  Grinberg, supra note 11, at 168; see also Gruber, supra note 214, at 150 n.90. 
216  See Grinberg, supra note 11, at 175 n.71. 
217  Paul Vigna, Bitcoin Developer Cites Community Rift in His Exit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 
2016, at C6. 
218  One of Bitcoin’s benefits over traditional banking is the close-to-real-time settlement, 
compared to overnight settlement in traditional banking. See Vivek Wadhwa, R.I.P. Bitcoin. 
It’s Time to Move On., WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.washington 
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vise the Bitcoin code to increase the block size caused huge controversy within 
the community, largely because it would change the incentive system for min-
ers.219 One of the most prominent Bitcoin proponents even sold his bitcoins and 
quit the community over the drama.220 If a proposal to change the block size 
can cause such disruption, surely a proposal to increase or decrease the maxi-
mum number of bitcoins would, too. It remains, however, technically possi-
ble.221 
The fact that the maximum number of bitcoins can be changed decreases 
the power of the enforcement mechanism in the bridging model as applied to 
Bitcoin. Bitcoin isn’t completely trustless—trust must be placed in the core de-
velopers and the network as a whole to adopt useful and appropriate modifica-
tions to the code as necessary.  
Because the exogenous enforcement mechanism isn’t perfect, some trust 
must exist to bridge the uncertainty distance between wanting to use Bitcoin 
and actually doing so. Or, put another way, individuals relying on the enforce-
ment mechanism to keep bitcoins’ value stable are not fully informed.  
Moreover, central bank management of currency is generally presumed to 
be a good thing.222 Yes, central bankers are fallible, but a flexible money supply 
helps control inflation and deflation, which can be destabilizing in an economy. 
Inflation occurs when the supply of money outpaces the demand for it; if sala-
ries go up, prices must also rise to appropriately ration or distribute goods and 
services among increasing numbers of potential buyers.223 Deflation occurs 
when the money supply is too small, and prices must shrink because too few 
market participants have enough money to purchase available goods and ser-
vices.224 The Fed monitors all of these factors and tweaks its monetary policy 
accordingly. 
post.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/01/19/r-i-p-bitcoin-its-time-to-move-on/ [https://perm 
a.cc/VCY5-EK73].
219  See Vigna, supra note 217. 
220  Nathaniel Popper, A Bitcoin Believer’s Crisis of Faith, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016),
www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/business/dealbook/the-bitcoin-believer-who-gave-up.html?_r 
=0 [https://perma.cc/LQ7L-LQLP]. 
221 Modifying the code requires a majority of nodes to consent to the change. This is different 
than the 51 percent attack, discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 231–234. It is 
more likely that 51 percent of the computing power of the network would agree to even a 
controversial modification, than that 51 percent of the network would agree to rewrite an 
existing block (thereby devaluing the entire blockchain). 
222  Golumbia, supra note 78, at 124, 127 (“[L]ack of regulation produces boom-and-bust 
cycles of an intensity far greater than the central bank regulation Bitcoin advocates loathe so 
much.”); CRAIG K. ELWELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS,
AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 7 (2014). 
223  See ELWELL ET AL., supra note 222, at 6; see also Cook, supra note 59, at 550–54. 
224  ELWELL ET AL., supra note 222, at 7. The price volatility alone makes Bitcoin a dysfunc-
tional currency. Golumbia, supra note 78, at 124. 
Fall 2016] THE BRIDGING MODEL 175 
As the code is currently written, bitcoins will cease to be produced once 21 
million have been mined.225 It is possible that once this cap is reached, there 
will not be enough bitcoins in circulation for each user to buy what they want. 
If this happens, the natural result will be deflation: prices will shrink to the 
point at which inventory can be sold to an appropriate number of buyers. 
Bitcoins are divisible to the eighth decimal place, so increasingly small transac-
tions are certainly possible.226 Shrinking prices, however, encourage hoard-
ing.227 If one bitcoin buys a pair of shoes today, but prices are decreasing, then 
that same bitcoin may buy two pairs of shoes next month. The rational econom-
ic actor would then delay purchasing, which, in the aggregate, causes the econ-
omy to sputter. 
For this reason, a flexible money supply is actually an economic boon. This 
suggests that Bitcoin-as-currency, analyzed via the bridging model, may be too 
enforcement-heavy to the extent that the maximum number of bitcoins is rigid-
ly set. A more significant component of trust here may actually be the prefera-
ble method by which to bridge the uncertainty distance: incorporating more 
trust-based human flexibility to manage the supply and value of bitcoins would 
actually make Bitcoin a more functional currency. 
B. Bitcoin as Payment System, Blockchain as Recordkeeper
As a payment system, the decentralized blockchain also operates by com-
putational certainty. Transactions are made by users and confirmed by the net-
work, which verifies that the sender owned the bitcoins and updates the ledger 
to reflect that the bitcoins are now in the recipient’s wallet.228 Here again, using 
the bridging model, the uncertainty distance between wanting to utilize the 
Bitcoin payment system and actually doing so would appear to be bridged en-
tirely by the enforcement-based software mechanism. 
Because there is no centralized recordkeeper, the Bitcoin protocol prohibits 
charge-backs, which further supports the entirely enforcement-based payment 
mechanism. Nakamoto wrote, “With the possibility of reversal, the need for 
trust spreads[,]” in apparent disparagement of trust.229 This thinking directly in-
forms the design of the blockchain: verification by consensus (rather than by 
trusted intermediary) by a method that cannot be undone. 
However, a certain component of trust in a payment system may be desira-
ble. A centralized, trusted recordkeeper can be appealed to in case of error. 
Fraudulent credit card charges, for instance, can be disputed, and such systems 
225  Grinberg, supra note 11, at 163. 
226  Chris Nunes, The 10,000 Foot Future Price of Bitcoin, MEDIUM (Apr. 17, 2015), 
https://medium.com/@ucnunes/the-10-000-foot-future-price-of-bitcoin-9c0ac15b7cfe#.npew 
wnda9 [https://perma.cc/8Y7L-8BQC]. 
227  ELWELL ET AL., supra note 222, at 7. 
228  See id. at 6. 
229  NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 1. 
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are in place to prevent individual users from being the victims of theft or fraud. 
With Bitcoin, however, there’s no one to complain to if a Bitcoin user sends 
bitcoins to the wrong address, or if bitcoins are stolen by a hacker. Such mis-
takes or thefts are irreversible, unless the recipient (who is functionally anony-
mous) voluntarily returns them. 
The lack of central recordkeeping also means that if a user loses their 
password, there’s no one to ask for retrieval. One of the more delightful ironies 
of the Bitcoin economy is that the best advice for keeping your password safe is 
to write it down on a piece of paper and keep that paper in a safe place.230 
Attacking the blockchain would be extremely difficult, since it would re-
quire marshalling at least 51 percent more computing power than the network 
already encompasses.231 Nakamoto was aware of this weakness, though he dis-
missed it on the grounds that the attacker would have no financial incentive to 
do so: Nakamoto assumed an attacker would be attempting to steal bitcoins, 
possibly by double-spending them.232 If such an attacker were to do so, the vio-
lation of the blockchain would eliminate its trustworthiness, causing the value 
of all bitcoins (including those owned by the attacker) to plunge.233 Stealing 
bitcoins for their value may not be an attacker’s goal, however: he, she, or they 
may simply want to destroy Bitcoin, “as a form of terrorism.”234 
Even with honest actors, blockchain snafus are possible. On March 11, 
2013, an incompatibility between Bitcoin version 0.7 and the recently-released 
version 0.8 caused a “hard fork,” in which the network computers running ver-
sion 0.7 began processing a different block than the computers running 0.8.235 
There were suddenly two different (and growing) versions of the ledger, which 
in turn meant that neither was reliable.236 Programmers noticed the problem al-
most immediately, and core developer Gavin Andresen moved quickly to re-
solve the hard fork.237 He did so simply by asking nicely: He convinced mining 
operation BTC Guild to revert its system to version 0.7.238 BTC Guild con-
trolled enough computing power within the network to shift the majority con-
sensus back to version 0.7, and the network as a whole disregarded the fork of 
230  Quentin Fottrell, To Secure Your Bitcoins, Print Them Out, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 26, 
2014, 11:09 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/to-secure-your-bitcoins-print-them-
out-2014-02-26 [https://perma.cc/5HMH-HBVL]. 
231  See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 3. 
232  See id. at 7. 
233  Id. at 4 (reasoning there’s no incentive “to undermine the system and the validity of his 
own wealth.”). 
234  Becker et al., supra note 31, at 4. 
235  Gruber, supra note 214, at 163; POPPER, supra note 8, at 193–95; see also VIGNA &
CASEY, supra note 10, at 149 (recounting the exchange between two chat-room participants 
as they realized what was happening: “Luke-jr: so??? yay accidental hardfork? :x Jouke: Ho-
ly crap.”). 
236  See Gruber, supra note 214, at 164. 
237  See POPPER, supra note 8, at 194; see also VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 150–51. 
238  POPPER, supra note 8, at 194–95. 
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the blockchain that had been begun to be generated by version 0.8.239 BTC 
Guild lost money by abandoning the version 0.8 blockchain.240 Without certain-
ty as to which blockchain was valid, however, its holdings—and everyone 
else’s—would have become worthless.241 In another ironic instance, then, a bug 
in the self-executing software caused a potentially catastrophic error in the sys-
tem, which was corrected by the very human intervention Bitcoin was designed 
to avoid. 
Because of the theoretical possibility of the blockchain being violated by a 
51 percent attack or by the more-likely occurrence of a hard fork, the block-
chain is therefore not as inviolable as may be presumed. The enforcement 
mechanism is not as robust as the popular narrative suggests, and some amount 
of trust is still necessary for users to bridge the uncertainty distance and begin 
using Bitcoin and the blockchain as a payment system. Indeed, given the possi-
bility of errors or software bugs creating unpredictable problems in the block-
chain, some measure of trust may actually be desirable. 
C. Third-Party Intermediaries
Because most people lack the computer literacy to participate directly in 
the Bitcoin ecosystem, many Bitcoin participants use the services of third par-
ties, who act as interfaces between the individual and Bitcoin.242 Engaging the-
se services requires a tremendous amount of trust, because enforcement is quite 
uncertain.243 
Most third-party intermediaries in the Bitcoin ecosystem hold their cus-
tomers’ bitcoins on their behalf—the individual customers are not reflected on 
the blockchain, but the intermediary is.244 The customers thus have a contractu-
239  Id. 
240  Id. 
241  See id. 
242  See supra Part I.D; see also Gruber, supra note 214, at 158–59. The Bitcoin Wiki website 
warns: 
When storing your bitcoins with a browser-based wallet on a third-party website, you are trust-
ing that the operator will not abscond with your bitcoins, and that operator maintains secure sys-
tems that protect against theft, internal or external. It is recommended that you obtain the real-
world identity of the website operator, ensure that sufficient recourse is available and avoid ser-
vices that do not use an offline wallet (cold storage) for bitcoins that are not needed for daily 
transactions. Storing significant quantities of bitcoins on third party websites is not recommend-
ed. 
Browser-based Wallet, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Browser-based_wallet 
[https:// perma.cc/5V39-JEVV] (last visited Aug. 23, 2016). 
243  See Gruber, supra note 214, at 207–08. Third party vendors demonstrate their trustwor-
thiness when they identify themselves. See POPPER, supra note 8, at 46–47 (discussing the 
power of core developer Gavin Andresen’s personal visibility in spreading trust in Bitcoin). 
244  Raskin, supra note 86, at 996. For example, the company Coinbase holds bitcoins on a 
customer’s behalf, but the company Blockchain.info does not; instead, it “provides software 
and infrastructure to allow customers to possess their own private keys.” Id. This requires 
extensive trust in the quality of service provided by the intermediary. Bitomat.pl, for exam-
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al relationship with the intermediary,245 and to forge that relationship they must 
overcome the uncertainty distance, not between themselves and Bitcoin, but be-
tween themselves and transacting with the intermediary.246 
The bridge, if it is built, must consist almost entirely of trust, because en-
forcement mechanisms here are minimal. The intermediaries conduct their 
business online, but are, in fact, located in jurisdictions all across the world. 
Enforcing contract claims in that situation would be difficult, to say the least.247 
Hackers steal bitcoins on a semi-regular basis. Numerous third-party in-
termediaries have been hacked, and customer bitcoins stolen: Bitcoin vendors 
Bitstamp, Bitcoin Savings and Trust, Bitfloor, Instawallet, and others have all 
been hacked, with hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of bitcoins stolen.248 
The most infamous of mismanaged and vulnerable intermediaries was Mt. Gox, 
which at one point processed nearly 80 percent of all Bitcoin transactions glob-
ally.249 Red flags abounded for years, but the company finally collapsed after 
admitting in February, 2014, that 850,000 bitcoins were gone, valued at about 
half a billion dollars.250 The company filed bankruptcy in Japan (and a related 
proceeding in the United States),251 and about a quarter of the missing bitcoins 
have been recovered so far.252  
Thus, using a third-party intermediary requires a tremendous amount of 
trust, since enforcement is nearly nonexistent.253 Because most people lack the 
computer literacy to participate directly in Bitcoin, however, significant trust in 
these third-party intermediaries is necessary for meaningful expansion of 
ple, once “incompetently lost the file that contained 25,000 bitcoins belonging to its users.” 
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 198. 
245  Bayern, supra note 13, at 25–26. 
246  This cuts against Bitcoin advocates’ argument that Bitcoin is democratic. Golumbia, su-
pra note 78, at 128 (“Despite their frequent use of the word ‘democratization’, such efforts 
are profoundly anti-democratic, insisting that the introduction of devices and software by a 
self-identified technocratic elite trumps duly-enacted laws and law enforcement mechanisms, 
and that a kind of market—a market in adoption of such services—is the exclusive method 
society should use to judge the provision of these services.”). 
247  See infra Part V.D. 
248  See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 33, at 8. 
249  Nathaniel Popper & Peter Lattman, Never Mind Facebook; Winklevoss Twins Rule in 
Digital Money, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2013, at A1. 
250  See generally Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million 
Disaster, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange 
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251  Tom Hals, Mt. Gox Files U.S. Bankruptcy, Opponents Call It a Ruse, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 
2014, 5:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-mtgox-bankruptcy-idUSBREA 
290WU20140310 [https://perma.cc/Q2GF-5T9W]; see also In re Mt. Gox, Ltd., No. 3:14-
BK-31229 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 09, 2014). 
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AGENDA (May 8, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://insidebitcoins.com/news/the-mt-gox-post-
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Bitcoin. Of course, Bitcoin was designed specifically to avoid the need for 
trusted third-party intermediaries.254 
D. Government Enforcement?
Bitcoin has its own internal enforcement mechanisms written into the code, 
but some would-be users may seek to rely on external enforcement mechanisms 
to bridge the uncertainty distance. Although the bridging model can incorporate 
a diverse definition of enforcement (network governance, public shaming, etc.), 
this section explores whether governmental enforcement mechanisms are relia-
ble in the Bitcoin context. 
Within the United States, government regulation of Bitcoin is minimal. 
This may make it a libertarian ideal, but it prevents would-be Bitcoin users 
from being able to rely on external enforcement mechanisms. Several federal 
agencies are exploring whether Bitcoin comes within their jurisdiction, but 
their actions are uncoordinated.255 To the extent enforcement has been effec-
tive, it has been in the criminal context rather than the civil; various federal law 
enforcement agencies have had significant success in shutting down Bitcoin-
related money laundering, drug dealing, and other criminal activities, but there 
is precious little consumer protection regulation for Bitcoin users.256 
This may be because we are not currently able to answer a surprisingly 
basic question: What is a bitcoin? A robust debate is ongoing about whether 
bitcoins are a currency, commodity, security, or property.257 If it’s a currency, 
it’s a non-governmental one, and no government support can be expected, 
though third-party intermediaries might conceivably be regulated under finan-
cial rules as money services businesses.258 If Bitcoin is a security or commodi-
ty, on the other hand, then enforcement lies with the Securities and Exchange 
254  See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 1. 
255  See, e.g., MURPHY ET AL., supra note 33, at 10–15. 
256  See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-496, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES:
EMERGING REGULATORY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION CHALLENGES 
(2014). 
257  See, e.g., Cara R. Baros, Note, Barter, Bearer, and Bitcoin: The Likely Future of State-
less Virtual Money, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 201, 202–03 (2014); Nicole Mirjanich, Com-
ment, Digital Money: Bitcoin’s Financial and Tax Future Despite Regulatory Uncertainty, 
64 DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 213–15 (2014); Aubrey K. Noonan, Comment, Bitcoin or Bust: 
Can One Really “Trust” One’s Digital Assets?, 7 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 583, 
584 (2015); Eric P. Pacy, Note, Tales from the Cryptocurrency: On Bitcoin, Square Pegs, 
and Round Holes, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 121, 122–23 (2014); Nicolas Wenker, Note, Online 
Currencies, Real-World Chaos: The Struggle to Regulate the Rise of Bitcoin, 19 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 145, 146–47 (2014).
258  See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 69, at 2–3; see generally Gruber, supra note 214; Mir-
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Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering and Money Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. BANKING 
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Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.259 If it is proper-
ty, as the IRS believes it is,260 then its ownership and transfer can theoretically 
be enforced by a robust body of contract and property law. Until consensus 
emerges, the governmental regulatory response to Bitcoin questions and chal-
lenges is likely to remain fractured. 
This assumes, of course, the civil procedure hurdles can be overcome: de-
termining where to file suit, identifying and serving a pseudonymous defend-
ant, and determining what law applies to a potentially international transac-
tion.261 
CONCLUSION 
Bitcoin has shaken up the way the world views money: it forces us to con-
front how comfortable we are with a financial system dependent on trusted in-
termediaries, and whether transparency and democracy are preferable to opaci-
ty when it comes to our financial health. But to call Bitcoin “trustless” is an 
oversimplification. Although Bitcoin contains mechanisms that make it pre-
dictable and reliable—the regular production of bitcoins, the publicly verified 
ledger—these mechanisms still rely on human involvement. Moreover, the 
Bitcoin code may strip away instances where trust and human overrides are ac-
tually preferable, in that they allow considered responses to unanticipated prob-
lems.  
The bridging model allows us to analyze the robustness of enforcement 
mechanisms in bridging the uncertainty distance between wanting to transact 
and transacting. It also allows us to articulate and analyze the interplay between 
enforcement and trust. Particularly as additional blockchain applications are 
explored, future work should critically analyze what roles enforcement and 
trust should play in the legal and social spaces. 
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(2014). 
261  See generally Raskin, supra note 86, at 970. 
